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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines some failures of the current Indonesian counterinsurgency 
(COIN) strategy in the Indonesian government’s efforts to eliminate the separatist 
insurgency in Papua. In doing so, this thesis uses the McCormick “Diamond” COIN 
model to measure and determine the mistakes of the Indonesian approaches from 1965 to 
2014. This thesis finds that the Indonesian COIN strategy has no balancing concept in 
applying its approaches toward the conflict. This thesis proposes alternative options for 
the Indonesian COIN strategy to completely destroy the insurgents in Papua in the future. 
In exploring the alternative methods, this thesis also practices the theory of the 
“Diamond” COIN model as a framework that leads to the conclusion that the Indonesian 
government must keep using limited coercive and smart political actions in dealing with 
the Papuan insurgency.  
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The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) continues (through its insurgents) to 
attempt to secede from the Republic of Indonesia. Although the Indonesian government 
has changed its approach in resolving this issue by using more political concepts rather 
than military force since the beginning of 2005, OPM insurgents have tended to increase 
their violations towards other people, including TNI soldiers and POLRI members. They 
also take advantage of the globalization effects that restrict the application of the 
Indonesian counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy to eliminate them. As a result, they 
apparently gain more support from the international community and currently are taking 
control over other Papuan people, especially those who live in remote areas.1 Therefore, 
the Indonesian government immediately needs alternative solutions regarding this 
insurgency to prevent the prolonged conflict from leading to the secession of the Papuan 
territory.  
This thesis evaluates some failures of the Indonesian current COIN strategy in 
destroying OPM insurgents. It also attempts to find the alternative approaches that the 
Indonesian government should apply in its COIN strategy to eliminate the OPM 
insurgents effectively. Therefore, this thesis utilizes a qualitative approach and begins 
with assumptions that Papua needs more than a special autonomy status to resolve this 
issue. This thesis then uses some possible theoretical lenses and surveys the historical 
conflict as well as analyzes some previous insurgent cases in Papua in seeking 
weaknesses of the current Indonesian COIN strategy. Thus, in achieving those results 
objectively, this thesis applies descriptive, analytical, and prescriptive methods in its 
research.  
Evaluation of the current Indonesian COIN strategy in Papua finds that the 
Indonesian government has failed to provide for the local Papuans’ needs and secure 
international support for overcoming the OPM insurgents. The failures happen because 
1 Kanis W.K., “Inilah Kasus Kekerasan di Papua Lima Bulan Terakhir [These are violations in the five 
last months in Papua],” Kompasiana Hukum, June 2, 2014, http://hukum.kompasiana.com/2014/06/02/
inilah-kasus-kekerasan-di-papua-5-bulan-terakhir--656183.html. 
 xvi 
the Indonesian government directly attacks the OPM armed and political insurgency 
before winning the hearts and minds of local people and guaranteeing their security. 
Moreover, the Indonesian government has made an incomplete effort to build 
relationships and conduct good diplomacy with both other countries and the United 
Nations to gain full support in destroying the OPM insurgency. This situation gives an 
opportunity to the OPM insurgents to win against the Indonesian central government in 
the competition to legitimize control over the Papuan people as a center of gravity and 
gain support from foreign countries. As a result, the Papuan people’s trust in the 
Indonesian central government has decreased, leading OPM insurgents to freely conduct 
further armed and political resistance in order to gain more support both domestically and 
internationally.2  
Improper military force, human rights violations, and false policies regarding the 
Papuan conflict are significant issues leading to the failure of Indonesian efforts in 
fulfilling the Papuan people’s needs. Moreover, due to the Indonesian central government 
having underestimated the OPM insurgents’ abilities to conduct both armed and political 
struggles, the Indonesian government began losing international support in 19723. As a 
result, although the Indonesian central government applied the special autonomy system 
in the Papuan territory and pulled troops from Papua in 2005, the OPM insurgents have 
continued their struggle.4 They keep fighting through various means to gain more support 
from other Papuans and international communities, leading the Indonesian government to 
face further difficulties and complexities in the efforts to destroy the OPM insurgency.  
The analytical assumption of this thesis also recommends alternative options for 
the Indonesian government to properly and effectively overcome OPM insurgents. The 
Indonesian central government must focus more on applying three essential keys of the 
“Diamond” COIN model from Gordon McCormick: enhancing the government’s 
                                                 
2 Yorrys T.H. Raweyai, Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent] 
(Presidium Dewan Papua, Jayapura: Desanti Grafika, 2002), 34.  
3 Ibid., 119. 
4 Andri Hadi, Papuans Need Democracy, Not Separatism, Jakarta, July 30, 2004. 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/07/30/papuans-need-democracy-not-separatism.html accessed 
June 9, 2015. 
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legitimacy and control over Papuan people and territory, destroying OPM’s abilities, and 
securing domestic and international support. This model encourages the Indonesian 
government to continue combining limited coercive actions and building consensus 
among the Papuan people in order to overcome the current OPM insurgency strategy. 
However, as one of the democratic countries in the world, the Indonesian government 
should keep properly combining those approaches to force the OPM insurgents into a 
situation where they have no support at all and cannot exist anymore.  
The Indonesian government should continue the implementation of the Papuan 
special autonomy policy and put the Papuan people’s welfare as a priority in making a 
policy regarding the PT Freeport Company in order to enhance its legitimacy and control 
over the Papuan people and territory. Furthermore, in destroying the OPM’s abilities, the 
Indonesian government should equip Papuan KODAM soldiers and deploy them 
effectively, as well as enforce the law in Papua strictly. Finally, the Indonesian 
government should secure its domestic and international support by winning the war of 
influence and by skillful diplomacy in a dynamic international political system. 
Therefore, by effectively and consistently applying these essential keys of the Diamond 
COIN Model, the Indonesian government can patch the weaknesses of its current COIN 
strategy in Papua to lead to the completely ruination of the OPM insurgency.  
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A. THESIS BACKGROUND  
As an archipelago country with a tremendous number of ethnicities, religions, and 
cultures, the most dangerous threat to Indonesian sovereignty is disintegration. 
Historically, Indonesia has successfully overcome many threats of disintegration. 
However, the East Timor5 insurgency succeeded in separating that province from 
Indonesia in 1999, and another threat, the Papua insurgency, known as the Free Papua 
Movement (OPM),6 has existed since 1964. The OPM is attempting to separate from the 
Republic of Indonesia by disrupting the stabilization of Indonesian national security in 
the Papuan territory.  
The OPM’s violations continue to escalate, and thus far the Indonesian 
government has failed to eliminate them. The OPM has taken advantage of globalization 
effects wherein democracy and human rights compel the Indonesian government to be 
more cautious in applying its strategy. An analysis of empirical data during a mission in 
Papua in 2003 suggests that the OPM divides its organization into two groups: armed 
separatists and political separatists. Through both these groups, the organization’s 
strategy is to highlight its struggle and gain support from the international community.  
According to the Military Regional Command of Papua (Komando Daerah Militer 
XVII Cendrawasih/Kodam XVII Cendrawasih),7 the OPM’s armed separatists have 
killed more than 25 Papuan Kodam soldiers and 15 civilians, including two Americans, 
                                                 
5 East Timor was the Indonesia’s 27th province. However, in 1999, following the United Nations 
sponsored act of self-determination, Indonesia relinquished control of the territory, and East Timor became 
a country on May 20, 2002. 
6 Pieter Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice: Decolonization and the Right to Self -Determination in 
West Papua (New York: Oneworld, 2009), 760. The OPM is an insurgency group in Papua Island that 
demands to separate from Indonesia. 
7 The Military Regional Command or Area Command is known as Komando Daerah Militer (Kodam). 
It is the key organization for strategic, tactical, and territorial operations for all services in the Indonesian 
National Defense Forces. 
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within the last two years.8 As a result, the security of the Papuan territory has been 
reduced to its lowest level in the last decade. In addition, the OPM’s political separatists 
have applied vertical organizational methods to develop international elements and 
mobilize popular support. Through the use of weapons, information technology, and 
diplomacy, these separatists systematically have improved their global reach. They have 
spread fear and weakened the trust of the local people in the Indonesian government. At 
the same time, they have gained international sympathy and support for their struggle.9  
After withdrawing the Indonesian Armed Forces from Papua because of 
international pressure in 2005, Indonesia granted special autonomy status to Papua and 
divided it into two provinces (Papua and West Papua). However, in the decade since, 
Papuan social and economic development has not changed significantly.10 Although 
Papua has abundant natural resources, the development of Papua has fallen short of the 
Papuan people’s expectations. According to current statistical data, the number of poor 
and unemployed people within the territory increases every year. The number of 
impoverished has risen from 760,350 in 2012 to 761,620 in 2013, and the number of 
unemployed has increased from 498,000 in 2012 to 536,000 in 2013.11 
The OPM’s goal is to separate from Indonesia. According to John Mackinlay, the 
OPM remains in the “Global Insurgent Forces” category. In that regard, the OPM 
survives in an international environment using support from different countries.12 The 
OPM’s political separatists have global connectivity, which they systemically exploit to 
obtain weapons. In addition, they use information to spread fear and break the trust of the 
                                                 
8 Kanis W.K., “Inilah Kasus Kekerasan di Papua Lima Bulan Terakhir [These are violations in the five 
last months in Papua],” Kompasiana Hukum, June 2, 2014, http://hukum.kompasiana.com/2014/06/02/
inilah-kasus-kekerasan-di-papua-5-bulan-terakhir--656183.html. 
9 Victor Krenak, “Civil Emergency Scenario in Papua,” in Internationalization of Papuan Issue: 
Actors, Modus Operandi, Motives, ed. Gerry Setiawan, 151–52 (Jakarta: Perum LKBN Antara, 2014), 152.   
10 Suara Pembaruan, “Tanah Papua Sarang Korupsi [Papuan Land is A Nest of Corruption],” 
September 26, 2014, http://sp.beritasatu.com/home/tanah-papua-sarang-korupsi-1/65669. 
11 Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Papua Barat [Central Bureau of Statistic of West Papua Province], 
“Indikator Kesejahteraan Rakyat Provinsi Papua Barat 2013 [The Indicator of West Papuan people’s 
welfare in 2013],” July 19, 2013, http://papuabarat.bps.go.id/publikasi/2014/
Indikator%20Kesejahteraan%20Rakyat%20Provinsi%20Papua%20Barat%202013/baca_publikasi.php#1. 
12 John Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 97–99. 
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people with the government. If there is no solution to this issue, it is possible Papua will 
become the next East Timor for Indonesia. Thus, the question is whether the current 
Indonesian counterinsurgency strategy is able to resolve the Papua insurgency? If not, 
then what is the best strategy to apply?  
B. PURPOSE 
According to Joseph Nye, Jr., “cultural conservatism, mistrust, civilian casualties, 
and local corruption make it difficult to win the hearts and minds that constitute the soft 
power part of a COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy.”13 Since the 2005 discontinuation of 
military operations, Indonesia has pursued a more diplomatic approach in its strategy and 
has extended a special autonomy status to Papua. However, the OPM continues to 
advocate separation from the Republic of Indonesia, while growing larger and even more 
violent than 10 years ago.  
Therefore, this thesis evaluates the current counterinsurgency strategy of the 
Indonesian government towards the OPM and attempts to identify the best policies to 
apply in the future. By understanding the historical conflict of Papua and analyzing 
previous insurgent cases, both domestically and internationally, this thesis provides a new 
perspective on the Indonesian strategy.  
C. THE WARNING OF DISINTEGRATION IN PAPUA  
The Act of Free Choice led Papua to integrate into Indonesia in 1969. However, 
for almost 46 years, a few Papuans have resisted Indonesian governance by joining the 
Free Papua Movement (OPM). They have committed many violations, although the 
Indonesian government has made numerous efforts to develop the Papua provinces. The 
history of these integration and development efforts, as well as the current condition of 
Papua, has led many analysts to regard other possible resolutions.     
Jacques Bertrand argues that democratization in Papua is insufficient to create a 
new term for integration. Special autonomy is not well established in Papua, and some 
groups resist it. These groups reiterate that they must have full independence, because 
                                                 
13 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 38. 
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they fear special autonomy will lead to the same outcome as the Act of Free Choice. As 
an archipelago country, democratization has created a dilemma for the Indonesian 
government. While the Indonesian government is proposing a substantial compromise by 
offering special autonomy, the insurgency does not see any opportunity beyond full 
independence from Indonesia. In the meantime, military and police operations aimed at 
destroying small groups of armed insurgents send a clear message that the Indonesian 
government is unwilling to compromise on its sovereignty. Such operations perpetuate 
the continued climate of fear and suppression of the local populations. They also open the 
possibility for a broader insurgency to emerge and promote a secession similar to East 
Timor’s, since the citizens of that nation held a similar perception of the integration 
process in Indonesia.14   
In addition, Pieter Drooglever deems the Papuan people as unprepared to exercise 
their right to self-determination and denounces the process of integration in Indonesia in 
1969 as unfair. He claims that neither a functional or mental integration into the 
Indonesian state was achieved after the Act of Free Choice because Papuan tribes remain 
in opposition to the Indonesian military.15 As a result, although Papua has abundant 
natural resources, most Papuans continue to subsist on inadequate welfare, with very little 
access to health amenities and education.16 However, Drooglever also realizes that a 
better solution is still available for the future of the Papuans. It depends on the Papuan 
society itself, the interest of the international community, and the interest of Indonesia in 
this area.17  
D. USEFUL CONCEPT  
In order to understand how the states in general should resolve their internal 
armed conflict, this thesis refers to Gordon McCormick’s COIN Diamond Model. 
                                                 
14 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 144–60. 
15 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 762. 
16 Peter King, West Papua & Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos? (Sidney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2004), 23.  
17 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 764. 
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According to McCormick, an interaction exists between the government, the insurgency, 
the population, and international actors.18 In any COIN strategy, the government and the 
insurgency compete to gain both the legitimacy of control over the population as a center 
of gravity and support from international actors.19  
E. RELEVANT CASES 
Before applying the Diamond Model as a means to measure the effectiveness of 
the Indonesian strategy in defeating the Papuan insurgency, it may be useful to briefly 
review the strategy of counterinsurgency approaches applied in both East Timor and Sri 
Lanka. These two cases were chosen because they contain many similarities to the Papua 
conflict, including its history, geography, and insurgent strategy. The secession of East 
Timor from Indonesia becomes a lesson learned for the failed strategy of the government.  
Mark Rolls describes the separation of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999 as the 
result of the misperception of Indonesian political leaders. They tended to make quick 
decisions in response to international pressure.20 The separation of East Timor 
demonstrates that the political approach and political leaders have a key role in facing an 
insurgency.  
In addition, Christopher Paul of the RAND Corporation claims that the end of 
Indonesia’s authority in East Timor dates from the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991. The 
incident caused horror globally and a new movement of criticism of Indonesian control in 
East Timor.21 The prolonged war and the violation of human rights led to increasing 
international attention and interference in efforts to resolve the conflict. The Indonesian 
                                                 
18 Greg Wilson, “The Mystic Diamond: Applying the Diamond Model of Counterinsurgency in the 
Philippines,” in Gangs and Guerillas: Ideas from Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism, ed. Michael 
Freeman and Hy Rothstein, 15–20 (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 17.  
19 Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare: The Professional 
Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 18, no. 2 (2005): 2. 
20 Mark Rolls, “Indonesia’s East Timor Experience,” in Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South 
East Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solution, ed. Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff, 166–94 (London: Sage 
Publications, 2003), 190.  
21 Christopher Paul, Path to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies (Santa Monica, California: 
RAND Cooperation, 2013), 379. 
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government allowed the East Timor insurgency to organize its cells broadly. As a result, 
the insurgency became more difficult to destroy.   
Meanwhile, the ruination of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri 
Lanka reveals a successful strategy in a counterinsurgency campaign. In contrast to the 
failed counterinsurgent example of East Timor, Stephen L. Battle describes how targeting 
the insurgents’ legitimacy became key to destroying the LTTE’s positive connection to 
the Tamil people. The LTTE was driven to the condition where there were no other 
options for it than to coerce the populations and to fight the Sri Lankan Armed Forces as 
long as possible. In addition, the events of 9/11 also affected the international 
community’s perception of violent groups. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces successfully 
separated the political insurgents from the armed insurgents. Consequently, the Sri 
Lankan government became capable of destroying the LTTE completely.22  
In addition, Eranda Malaka Chandrasa analyzes how the power of political will 
and the stability of the government, the change of international influences, and a 
particular military and naval strategy contributed to the destruction of LTTE in 2009. 
Internal political stability, loss of support from the international system, and the ability of 
the Sri Lankan Armed Forces to adopt an effective strategy were the three main variables 
of a COIN strategy that ended the conflict.23 In short, the most important key to winning 
the war was the Sri Lankan government’s willingness to learn and adapt to the dynamic 
conflict.  
F. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODS  
This thesis attempts to answer why some groups of Papua continue struggling to 
separate from Indonesia, and what the best Indonesian counterinsurgency strategy should 
be in order to benefit everyone.  
                                                 
22 Stephen L. Battle, “Lesson In Legitimacy: The LTTE End-Game Of 2007-2009” (Master Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).  
23 Eranda Malaka Chandradasa, “Adaptive COIN in Sri Lanka: What Contributed to the Demise of the 
LTEE?” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012). 
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In order to answer those questions, this thesis utilizes a qualitative approach and 
begins with the assumption that Papua needs more than a special autonomy status to 
eliminate the threat from its insurgents. This thesis then applies McCormick’s Diamond 
Model in an effort to identify weaknesses within the Indonesian current strategy in Papua. 
Finally, this thesis recommends solutions that could be applicable in eliminating the 
Papua insurgency. In order to offer a feasible solution, this thesis applies 
counterinsurgency theories drawn from the McCormick Model and examines the 
Indonesian government’s current military approaches. This thesis recommends real 
solutions, wherein all the stakeholders will have clear incentives to pursue the solutions 
and knowledge of how to achieve those goals according to each function. This approach 
will offer a better solution for the Papua conflict in the present and the future.  
G. CONTENT OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II (The Historical Background of the Dispute) begins with a brief 
discussion of early Papua before and under Dutch colonization. It explains how the Dutch 
took over Western Papua from the Sultan of Tidore from North Moluccas. This chapter 
then describes the integration process of Papua into Indonesia through the Act of Free 
Choice (Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat/PEPERA) in 1969. This act led to the reemergence 
of the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM), which as an insurgency 
opposes the Indonesian government. 
Chapter III (Flaws in the Indonesian Counterinsurgency Strategy) provides the 
failed approaches of the Indonesian government and examines the Indonesian 
government’s COIN strategy against the OPM insurgency during the New Order and the 
Reformation Era.  
Chapter IV (Improving the Indonesian COIN Strategy) proposes some ideas as 
recommendations for the Indonesian government to support its current COIN strategy in 
order to completely destroy Papuan insurgents in the future. This part uses three 
important keys of the COIN Diamond Model as a framework: enhancing the government 
legitimacy and control over Papuan people and territory, destroying the OPM’s abilities, 
and securing domestic and international support.  
 8 
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II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE 
“When you look at the past without God’s eyes, you subject yourself to 
deception. The past no longer exists and God doesn’t linger there. 
However, Satan will show you whatever you want to see and believe, so 
you will be trapped in an emotion that cannot communicate truth, beyond 
what you want to remember.”  
–Shannon L. Alder 
A. INTRODUCTION  
One of the main issues fueling the Papuan insurgency is the dispute over Papua’s 
history. The OPM believes that Papuans are completely different, ethnically, from most 
other Indonesian people, and that Papua is not part of the Dutch East Indies territory, 
despite the decolonized negotiation between Indonesia and the Dutch in 1949. They also 
claim that the Papuans are not involved in any negotiation regarding their own freedom. 
They oppose the results of the Act of Free Choice, claiming that it was an unfair process 
intended to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia. On the other hand, the Indonesian 
government asserts that the process of integrating Papua into Indonesia is legal, having 
been approved by the United Nations in August 1969, and that the OPM and its free 
movement represent a repetition of Dutch attempts to create a federal state in this 
territory (see Figure 1) during negotiation in the 1960s.24  
This chapter explores early Papuan history up to and including the emergence of 
the OPM. It begins with pre-Dutch colonization and continues through colonization and 
concludes with the process of integration by exploring the periods immediately before 
and after the Act of Free Choice. This chapter also identifies the emergence of the OPM 
and its resistance against the Indonesian government as the origin of the current conflict 
in this territory (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
24 Mark T. Berger and Edward Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia? Nationalism after 
Decolonisation and the Limits of the Nation-State in Post-Cold War South East Asia,” Third World 
Quarterly 22, no. 6 (2001): 1014. 
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Figure 1.  Political Map of Indonesia  
 
Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/indonesia_map2.htm, accessed June 
7, 2015 
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Figure 2.  Map of Papua, Indonesia  
 
Source: http://www.japanfocus.org/-David_Adam-Stott/3597/article.html, accessed June 
7, 2015 
B. EARLY PAPUA 
New Guinea, one of the largest islands in the world, is shaped like a giant 
bird. If one were to superimpose it into a map of Europe, the most 
westerly part, the Bird’s Head Peninsula, would cover the area between 
Antwerp and Liverpool, while the tail-feathers of the island would touch 
the Black Sea. 
 – Dr. Pieter Drooglever25 
1. Pre-Dutch Colonization 
Since the Thirteenth Century, Ternate and Tidore were the most important 
Moluccan Islamic kingdoms in the west of New Guinea. They possessed maritime forces 
that were used to expand their influence significantly throughout the surrounding 
                                                 
25 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 1. 
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territories before the first Portuguese arrived in the fifteenth century (see Figure 3). 
According to Drooglever, “the Ternate Kingdom extended to the South and the West and 
reached as far as the Celebes and Sunda Islands. The Tidore sultans, meanwhile, had their 
sights set on the East and their influence stretched as far as the nearby coastal area of 
New Guinea.”26 The Tidore sultans led the Uli Siwa (Nine Alliance) that occupied Tidore 
Island, Makyan, Halmahera, all the islands surrounding them, and Papua. As Drooglever 
says, “The Papuans are a primitive people, consisting of dark skinned individuals with 
frizzy curls, tall and muscular in the coastal areas but small and hardy inland.”27 The 
Tidore administration in Papua Island was represented by the Papuan kings (rajas) who 
started with the first king, Gura Besi, who swore to exercise his authority in the name of 
Tidore. The link between Tidore and the Papuan kings was also displayed by a large fleet 
of Papuan kora-koras employed to reinforce the Tidore monarchy when the Portuguese 
laid siege to Tidore in 1534. Thus, regular contact and cooperation between the Tidore 
sultans and Papuans originated many centuries ago.28 
Figure 3.  Map of Tidore in Indonesia  
 
Source: https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/15474/ID, accessed June 8, 2015 
                                                 
26 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 3. 
27 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 2. 
28 Rosmaida Sinaga, Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua 1898–1962 [The Ducth Term in Papua 1898 – 
1962] (Depok, Jawa Barat: Komunitas Bambu, 2013), 36.   
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Although Alvaro de Saavedra was the first Spaniard to land on Papua Island in 
1529, Ynigo Ortiz de Retez was the first to live there afterwards. He claimed Papua as a 
Spanish territory and called it Nueva Gvince (New Guinea). Basically, the Spaniards 
sought gold, but they could not find it there. Thus, they left for Panama and never 
returned. During this period, the Tidore sultans still maintained their hegemony in the 
Raja Ampat’s territory and the northwest coast of New Guinea. The raja (or Major) 
Kimelaha was responsible, directly and indirectly, for gathering the tribute owed to the 
Tidore sultans. This gathering of tribute has been recognized as one of the motivations 
for Dutch involvement in this territory.29  
In 1667, the Dutch states began to cooperate with the Tidore through the Dutch 
East India Company (DEIC). The Dutch succeeded in persuading the sultan to promise 
cooperation with the DEIC solely and to forego other foreign alliances. The DEIC then 
occupied the Sultanate of Tidore in 1780 and took control of the suzerain of New Guinea. 
In 1793, British forces established a fort in the west of New Guinea but abandoned it two 
years later.30 This seizure triggered a series of wars against the Dutch, led by the new 
sultan of Tidore, Muhammad Amiruddin, who was well known as Sultan Nuku. He was 
supported by the Papuans in his fight against the Dutch colonial powers, which were 
stationed in Hitu (Ambon), Banda Islands, and Ternate Island. Although Sultan Nuku, the 
face of this resistance to foreign rule, died in 1805, the resistance resumed when the 
English occupied the Moluccas in 1810 and agreed to the Anglo-Dutch Treaty in 1824.31  
This agreement led to the return of the previous Dutch territory in Moluccas, 
including the Ternate, Tidore, and the west of Papua. In 1865, the 141st Meridian was 
claimed by the Netherland East Indies government as its eastern border in order to 
prevent the emergence of potential rivals from Europe. This territory became Dutch New 
Guinea. As a result, both Britain and Germany were forced to focus on the other half of 
the island (the Papua New Guinea territory in present). In 1898, “the western half of New 
                                                 
29 Sinaga, Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua 1898–1962 [The Ducth Term in Papua 1898 – 1962], 37.  
30 Sinaga, Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua 1898–1962 [The Ducth Term in Papua 1898 – 1962], 39–
40. 
31 Sinaga, Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua 1898–1962 [The Ducth Term in Papua 1898 – 1962], 40. 
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Guinea was divided into two administrative afdelingen (divisions). Each one was 
governed by a Dutch civil servant with the rank of assistant resident. Both were 
subordinate to the resident in Ternate.”32  
 2. Papua under Dutch Colonization 
In the years following, the Dutch established control in most of Papua, including 
Merauke, the remote corner area, which would administer Dutch rule in the East Indies. 
At first, the natives accepted the Dutch expeditions, but after discovering the Dutch’s true 
intention to occupy their territory and control them, the natives fought the Dutch bitterly. 
As a result, many Papuans and Dutch were killed during the period before a 1907 Dutch 
East Indies military reconnaissance mission. With support from military personnel and 
hundreds of officers of the East Indian Army, this mission explored large sections of the 
island and systematically carried out agricultural projects. Meanwhile, the Dutch 
masterminded a situation in which the authority of the Tidore prince became notional, 
and the prince was reduced to a shadowy figure with no influence. The Dutch encouraged 
the committee of grandees of the sultanate to run the sultanate for many years. However, 
the unsophisticated weapons and technology of both the Sultanate of Tidore and Papuans 
made it impossible to resist the Dutch. As a result, the Dutch administration assumed the 
real power over the island, though in practice most of the island remained unaffected by 
colonial rule.33  
By the late 1920s, the emergence of Indonesian nationalist movements, which 
shared the commonality of colonial oppression, became the dominant theme of the 
archipelago. However, Dutch colonials in Java, Sumatera, Borneo, and Celebes Islands 
repressed and cruelly captured many nationalists, who, along with their families, were 
exiled to Papua where Dutch colonials had administrative control. These nationalists 
were sent in exile to Tanah Merah–Bouven Digul, about 500 kilometers inland from 
inhabitants in the south coast of the Papua Island. Before they were moved to Banda 
Neira Island in the Moluccas, the founding fathers of Indonesia, such as Sutan Syahrir 
                                                 
32 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 14. 
33 Berger and Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia?,” 1013. 
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and Mohammad Hatta, spent a year in Tanah Merah–Bouven Digul, which was a 
terrifying place.34 Their exile strengthened the brotherhood between Papuans and the 
people from other islands in the archipelago, leading to the common nationalism of 
Indonesians.35  
In 1942, the Japanese seized control of Papua from the Dutch as a part of Japan’s 
campaign of conquest in the Pacific. According to Berger and Aspinal, there were only 
15 colonial administrative posts in the Netherlands New Guinea when the Japanese 
conquered this territory and found some early pro-Indonesian sentiment.36 Their 
discovery lent credence to the fact that Dutch colonials had limited exploration and 
authority in Papua, using it simply as a control point for sea access for the herb and spice 
trade.  
The Indonesian nationalist movement increased from 1942 to 1945 during the 
Japanese occupation. In response, Japan changed its policy to allow Indonesian 
nationalists to conduct wide communication across the archipelago, including Papua, to 
spread their nationalist spirit. Moreover, according to Peter King, when U.S. General 
Douglas MacArthur conquered the West New Guinea capital of Holandia (Jayapura) in 
order to retake Southeast Asia, the United States and Australia played a larger role in the 
liberation of Papua from the Japanese in 1944 than the Dutch.37 As a result, after 
Indonesian independence on August 17, 1945, the Indonesian nationalists and the pro-
Indonesian Papuans insisted on integrating Papua into Indonesia, fueling the long 
negotiation process between the Indonesian state and the Dutch Empire. As Yorrys T.H. 
Raweyai notes, the pro-Indonesian Papuans strengthened their movement by raising the 
Indonesian flag on the same day as the birthday of the queen of the Dutch Empire, 
Wilhelmina, on August 31, 1945, and the ceremony was attended by Papuan executive 
                                                 
34 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 31–32.  
35 Bernarda Materay, Nasionalisme Ganda Orang Papua [Papuans’ Double Nationalism] (Jakarta: 
Kompas Media Nusantara, 2012), 53. 
36 Berger and Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia?,” 1013. 
37 King, West Papua & Indonesia Since Suharto, 20. 
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leaders such as Frans and Markus Kaisiepo, Marinus Krey, and Nicolas Jouwe.38 A year 
later, in November 1946, Indonesia established the Komite Indonesia Merdeka (KIM) in 
Holandia, the purpose of which was to keep an independent Indonesia in West New 
Guinea. More than 150 people, Papuans and other Indonesian nationalists from different 
parts of the archipelago, attended this inaugural meeting.39  
C. THE INTEGRATION PROCESS 
Insistent on colonizing the Indonesian archipelago by means of violence over the 
Linggar Jati Agreement, the Dutch conducted military aggressions in 1947 and 1948 that 
were repelled by both the Indonesian military and the Indonesian people. This situation 
led the international community, influenced by the trend of decolonization, to pay more 
attention to the conflict in this territory. The international community, represented by 
England, encouraged the Indonesian government and the Dutch empire to conduct further 
negotiations toward a resolution for both countries. Indonesian independence was 
declared in 1945, but was not formally acknowledged until 1949 through the Round 
Table Agreement, which referenced Papua.40  
1. A Long Way to the Agreement 
In this situation, The Dutch sought to salvage some of their pride and 
prestige—and maintain access to at least a portion of Indies’ fabulous 
resources. They contrived to reach an agreement on independence with 
Soekarno that set aside the transfer of sovereignty over West New Guinea 
from the general transfer that saw Indonesia gain internationally 
recognized independence in 1949.  
 – Peter King41 
In Round Table Conventions (Konferensi Meja Bundar [KMB]), conducted from 
August 23, 1949, to November 2, 1949, in Den Haag, the Netherlands pursued ways to 
                                                 
38 Yorrys T.H. Raweyai, Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent] 
(Presidium Dewan Papua, Jayapura: Desanti Grafika, 2002), 21. 
39 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 90. 
40 Max Lane, Unfinished Nation: Indonesia before and after Suharto (New York: Verso, 2008), 23. 
41 King, West Papua & Indonesia since Suharto, 21. 
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avoid Papua becoming one of the issues of negotiation. However, the Indonesian 
delegations succeeded in reaching an agreement that acknowledged Indonesian 
independence and determined the completion of Papua’s status a year later.42 This 
agreement reflected the firm stance of the Indonesians in demanding that the transfer of 
authority contain all the Netherlands Indies’ formerly administrated territories. Moreover, 
the trends of decolonization in Southeast Asia effectively pressured the Dutch to agree 
with the Indonesian delegation’s proposal, which was supported by the international 
community. Subsequently, the Dutch attempted to delay resolving the Papua issue 
through meetings in both December 1950 and December 1951 in Den Haag, Netherlands. 
In sum, a treaty was not agreed upon within five years after KMB, and this led the 
Indonesian government to bring the dispute before the United Nation General Assembly 
in 1954.43 
The Indonesian government formally addressed the Papua dispute to the Ninth 
Session of the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1954, and received support from 
the Soviet Union, Cuba, and some Asian and African countries. Indonesia, however, 
failed to gain a majority of votes in resolving the Papua dispute because most of the 
Western countries, including the United States, sided with the Dutch. Even though the 
United States abstained from voting, the Indonesian president, Soekarno, was 
disappointed in American’s foreign policy. As a result, Soekarno mobilized popular 
support, especially from the Soviet Union, and attempted to unite internal opposition in a 
campaign to fight the Dutch colonization of West New Guinea.44  
After the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia [PKI]) won the 
election in 1955, President Soekarno progressively strengthened the relationship between 
Indonesia and the Soviet Union by inviting the Soviet president, Voroshilov, and his 
prime minister, Khrushchev, to Indonesia. As a result, after 1957, the Soviet Union 
agreed to loan US$450 million in weapons to Indonesia and provided diplomatic support, 
                                                 
42 William Henderson, West New Guinea: The Dispute and Its Settlement (South Orange, NJ: Seton 
Hall University Press, 1973), 23. 
43 Raweyai, Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent], 24. 
44 Berger and Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia?,” 1013. 
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specifically for the integration of Papua.45 By 1961, this cooperation allowed Indonesia 
to become one of the strongest armed forces in South Asia. Of course, such cooperation 
also worried most Western countries and especially the United States, which led 
Washington to change its foreign policy regarding the Indonesian matter.  
The Cold War affected the political atmosphere in Southeast Asia and especially 
Indonesia, which after 1955 tended to be more influenced by the Indonesian Communist 
Party and the USSR. As Aspinal and Berger note, the pressure on the United States had 
been increased by Soekarno in the late 1950s, and he turned to the Soviet Union for 
military and economic support, while threatening war against the Dutch in the Papuan 
region.46 Therefore, in order to gain increased influence against the USSR in Indonesia, 
John F. Kennedy, after being elected U.S. president in November 1960, turned his 
attention to Jakarta. The United States initiated peace offerings to Indonesia regarding the 
Papua territory and proposed acting as a third party in negotiations between Indonesia 
and the Dutch. This proposal compelled the Dutch Empire to realize that sooner or later 
they would lose Papua; therefore, the Dutch set into motion a process of self-
determination for a small group of Papuans, leading to independence and ultimately 
spawning Papua nationalism.47 
While international support for Indonesia increased, the Dutch deployed an 
aircraft carrier into West Papuan waters and established the New Guinea Council, 
adopting West Papua as the name of the territory; on December 1, 1961, they designed 
and presented an anthem and flag, as well as other nationalist attributes.48 In response, 
President Soekarno and other Indonesian nationalists rejected the Dutch claim and 
declared the People’s Three Commands (Tri Komando Rakyat [Trikora]), sparking a 
campaign of military force in a form of the Mandala operation to resolve this dispute. 
Negotiations between the two countries reached a deadlock, and when small-armed 
                                                 
45 Raweyai, Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent], 25. 
46 Berger and Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia?,” 1014. 
47 Berger and Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia?,” 1013. 
48 Jan Pouwer, “The Colonisation, Decolonisation and Recolonisation of West Guinea,” Journal of 
Pacific History 34, no. 2(1999): 168. 
 19 
conflicts occurred in Papuan water and on land, larger military confrontations between 
Indonesian and Dutch forces became foreseeable.49  
With support from the USSR, such a military campaign seemed likely to succeed, 
even though opposed by the United States. To counter, the United States effectively 
switched its support to Indonesia and encouraged Australia to join it. President Kennedy 
then met President Soekarno on February 21, 1962, and designated both his brother, 
Robert F. Kennedy, and the U.S. permanent envoy for the United Nations, Ellsworth 
Bunker, to pursue the diplomatic approach in solving the Papuan dispute. As a result, in 
August 1962, the United Nations proposed the New York agreement, which was signed 
by both Indonesia and the Dutch. This agreement forced the Dutch to transfer control of 
West New Guinea to Indonesia by May 1963 and to put in place the Temporary 
Executive Authority (UNTEA) during the transition period. The New York agreement 
also confirmed Indonesian sovereignty and determined that an Act of Free Choice for the 
Papuan people needed to be conducted within six years of the transfer of sovereignty.50 
2. The Emergence of The Free Papua Movement Insurgency 
The United Nations designated Jose Rolz Bennet from Guatemala as UNTEA’s 
chief administrator, and UNTEA assumed responsibility for the transfer of sovereignty on 
October 1, 1962. According to the New York agreement, UNTEA’s staffs were to act as 
mediators and supervisors of the administrative transfer. They also had to explain the 
plan and process of the Act of Free Choice to the Papuan people during that time. In 
short, the UNTEA had full authority to advise and assist the process of sovereignty 
transferring.51 After one year, UNTEA formally handed over West New Guinea’s 
administration to Indonesia in May 1963, and the entire responsibility fell to the 
Indonesian government, which then renamed Papua as Irian Jaya and designated a local 
Papuan, E.J. Bonay, as the first Papuan governor.52  
                                                 
49 Muhammad Yusran Halmin, “The Implementation of Special Autonomy in West Papua, Indonesia: 
Problems and Recommendations” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 15. 
50 King, West Papua & Indonesia since Suharto, 22.   
51 Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice, 661. 
52 Raweyai, Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent], 33. 
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Pro-integration Papuans hailed the new chapter of their national life, yet a small 
number of anti-integration Papuans insisted on separating from Indonesia. Most anti-
integration Papuans, such as John Ariks, Melkianus Awom, and Karel Gobay, were 
former members of New Guinea Council, established by the Dutch in 1961. They thought 
Papuans should not have bowed to the control of powers they had not acknowledged, 
such as the West and Indonesia, and they believed Papuans had entered into a fate they 
did not choose. They insisted that the decolonization war against the Dutch and the early 
independence struggle did not include Irian Jaya. Thus, the bonds of common adversity 
that wrapped the rest of nation did not apply.53 They established the nationalist guerilla 
organization, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka [OPM]) and 
attacked Indonesian military posts on July 26, 1964, as a declaration of an armed 
rebellion.54 
The coup attempt by the PKI, and the subsequent internal political conflict in 
1965, caused a change in Indonesian leadership from Soekarno to Soeharto. The 
subsequent promise of stability and security drove Soeharto and his New Order to prefer 
a military approach in eliminating the rebellion. During 1966 to 1968, the Indonesian 
Armed Forces succeeded in destroying many OPM insurgents: 75 insurgents were killed, 
60 were captured, and more than 40 were forced to surrender.55 The New Order 
government undertook this effort seriously, in order to consolidate its authority in the 
Irian Jaya territory. Meanwhile, by receiving strong support from the dominant Western 
powers, the military’s approach became a non-issue for Western audiences. 
Consequently, the OPM’s insurgents quickly became isolated from external communities. 
However, it was impossible for the Indonesian Armed Forces to eliminate the OPM 
insurgency entirely due to the territory’s geographical vastness, large dispersal of 
population, and extreme ethno-linguistic diversity. Thus, even though the stability of 
security had been restored, the insurgents remained, especially in the inlands.  
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3. The Act of Free Choice and Its Controversy  
According to the New York Agreement signed on August 15, 1962, Indonesian 
officials agreed to a referendum, supervised by the United Nations, before the end of the 
year 1969.56 On August 12, 1968, the United Nations sent a supervision team led by 
Fernando Ortiz, a Bolivian diplomat, to Irian Jaya. This team consisted of the UN experts 
tasked to assist, advise, and participate in the process of an Act of Free Choice, which 
would be implemented a year later.57 They came earlier to Irian Jaya in order to assist the 
Indonesian government in the preparation process, including the Act of Free Choice’s 
formulation. They had the authority and power, as representatives of the United Nations, 
to enforce rule and guarantee that the implementation of an Act of Free Choice had been 
congruent with UN favor.   
After several meetings, the Indonesian government addressed a proposal for an 
Act of Free Choice’s implementation that would organize a system of voting under 
supervision of the UN on February 18, 1969. The Indonesian Observer newspapers 
published this proposal on February 24, 1969, followed by the Djakarta Post newspapers 
on February 26, 1969.58 This proposal advocated a representative system of vote 
collection, not a one-man/one-vote system, due to extreme geographical challenges; in 
addition, the Indonesian government would encounter many difficulties in terms of 
communication, language diversity, transportation, illiteracy, and societal backwardness. 
The supervision team accepted the proposal in which an Act of Free Choice would be 
conducted through a representative system. As Andri Hadi claims, the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 1514 (1960) did not mention one-man/one-vote systems as the only 
method for referendum process, and many new states in Africa, as well as Malaysia, in 
the early 1960s did not apply that system either.59 Therefore, the Indonesian government 
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organized an Act of Free Choice with a representative vote system starting on July 14, 
1969.  
The first implementation of an Act of Free Choice occurred in Merauke on July 
14, 1969, then Jaya Wijaya on July 16, Painai on July 19, Fak-Fak on July 23, Sorong on 
July 26, Manokwari on July 29, Teluk Cendrawasih on July 31, and Jayapura on August 
2. The UN supervision team, Indonesian politicians and military officials, foreign 
ambassadors, and domestic and international journalists monitored the voting in which a 
majority of 1,025 representatives agreed to integrate into Indonesia.60 This Act of Free 
Choice in Irian Jaya was directly supervised by the UN and closely observed by 
international representatives and journalists morally responsible to report any improper 
vote collecting process. Since there was no interruption or objection regarding the 
implementation of an Act of Free Choice, the United Nations legalized it through UN 
Resolution 2509, and the Indonesian government ratified it in 1971. By that time, Papua 
territory was integrated into Indonesia as the Irian Jaya province. 
D. SUMMARY 
In the early history of Papua, Tidore was one of the most important Moluccan 
Islam kingdoms in the west of New Guinea island, and it maintained its hegemony until 
the Dutch expansion in 1667. After a series of attempts to destroy the influence of the 
Tidore sultanate in the region, the Dutch colonized most of western coastal Papua and 
initiated their rule in 1805. Since the Sultanate of Tidore had inadequate ability to fight 
the sophisticated Dutch military at the time, the Dutch emerged as the only authority with 
complete control over Papua. However, in a practical sense, most parts of the island were 
unaffected by colonial rule and still remained subordinate to the resident in Ternate.61 
The Japanese policy of allowing Indonesian nationalists to spread their 
nationalism during the Japanese occupation in 1942 to 1945 proved key to building 
Indonesian nationalism within the Papua territory. Moreover, the Dutch policy 
designating Papua as the exile site for Indonesian nationalists fostered a strong 
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brotherhood between Papuans and the people from the other islands in the archipelago, 
leading to a common nationalism. As a result, most Papuans insisted on integrating into 
Indonesia, leading to acrimony in the negotiation process between the Indonesia and the 
Dutch Empire after the declaration of independence on August 17, 1945.62 
The trend of decolonization in the world led the international community to 
pressure the Dutch to acknowledge Indonesian independence and to further discuss the 
status of Papua a year after the agreement of the Round Table Conventions was signed in 
1949. However, the Dutch’s betrayal and the consistency of the Indonesian nationalists 
regarding Papua drove the Indonesian government to consider military force as a means 
to solve the dispute. Fortunately, the Cold War had effectively influenced the political 
atmosphere in Southeast Asia by the late 1950s. This situation led the United States to 
switch its support to Indonesia, and the UN to encourage the Dutch to sign the New York 
Agreement in August 1962. This agreement forced the Dutch to transfer control of Papua 
to Indonesia by May 1963 and mandated that an Act of Free Choice of the Papuan people 
be conducted within six years afterwards.63  
The emergence of the OPM insurgency on July 26, 1964, was largely influenced 
by the Dutch, with repetitive tactics intended to maintain Dutch hegemony in the 
Indonesian archipelago. Most of OPM insurgents were former members of the New 
Guinea Council, established by the Dutch three years earlier. The change to Indonesia’s 
internal political environment in 1965, along with support from the main Western 
countries afterwards, led the New Order regime to use coercive actions to destroy the 
insurgency. However, since the geographical challenge was the most difficult obstacle for 
the Indonesian Armed Forces, the insurgency could not be completely destroyed, and 
eventually it returned among the inlands of Papua territory.64  
The United Nation accepted the result of An Act of Free Choice in 1969 and 
recognized the integration of Papua into Indonesia as completely legal. The UN 
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supervision team agreed beforehand with the Indonesian proposal regarding the system 
undertaken to implement An Act of Free Choice. Since the Indonesian government had 
limited ability to reach the territory entirely, it used a precedent system previously 
conducted in Africa and Malaysia in order to collect votes. Moreover, this practice of An 
Act of Free Choice, which was held from July 14 to August 2, 1969, was directly 
supervised by UN personnel and closely observed by international delegates and 
journalists.65 Thus, by 1971, Papua territory legally integrated into Indonesia as one of 
Indonesian provinces, Irian Jaya. 
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III. FLAWS IN THE INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY 
STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Indonesian government took control over West Papua from UNTEA on 
May 1, 1963, the OPM has insisted on Papua’s secession from Indonesia. The 
organization has waged a secessionist insurgency by way of political and violent means 
to achieve its goal. An insurgency employs political resources and violence to destroy 
political aspects of the legal state’s legitimacy.66 In this regard, the OPM has devised and 
implemented strategies to extend various forms of assistance, and to receive, in turn, both 
domestic and international support. However, the OPM also conducts organized violence 
against the Indonesian government. 
Since 1963, the Indonesian government has undertaken a COIN strategy to 
overcome the OPM. According to Julian Paget, the origins and aims of insurgencies will 
vary, and the real enemies will be difficult to see, but a good COIN strategy will not 
change greatly.67 Therefore, the Indonesian government has confidently applied the same 
COIN strategy that previously proved successful in destroying the Darul Islam Rebellion 
in 1948 and the Republic of South Maluku rebellion in 1950. Both rebellions were 
eliminated within a year by directly using a comparatively more powerful armed force. 
As a result, during the New Order Era from 1965 to 1998, under President Soeharto, the 
Indonesian government adopted a military approach as the main means for destroying the 
OPM insurgents, not only in Papua, but in other provinces such as East Timor and Aceh 
where insurgents also fought against Indonesian rule. 
The secession of East Timor in 1998 and the peaceful resolution of Aceh in 2005 
led the Indonesian government to pursue further political approaches in overcoming the 
OPM insurgents. The withdrawal of reinforced troops from Papua and application of 
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special autonomy status in Papuan governance in 2005 demonstrated the goodwill of the 
Indonesian government. However, the OPM insurgency continued to insist on separating 
Papua from the Indonesian republic. This situation raised the question of why the 
previously successful Indonesian COIN strategy had failed to eliminate the separatist 
movement in Papua. In order to answer this question, this chapter examines the 
Indonesian COIN strategy from the New Order to the Reformation Era by applying 
McCormick’s Diamond Model.  
B. THE “DIAMOND” COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL 
Strategy is all about how (way of concept) leadership will use the power 
(means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of 
circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that 
support state interests. 
– H. Richard Yarger68 
In evaluating the failure of the Indonesian COIN strategy during the New Order 
and Reformation Era, McCormick’s model suggests that there is an ongoing interaction 
among the following elements: the Indonesian government, the OPM insurgency, the 
local population, and various international actors. The Indonesian government and the 
OPM insurgency compete to gain legitimate control over the local population as a center 
of gravity (COG) and to obtain support from international actors (see Figure 4). The 
Indonesian government will gain the legitimacy and support from the COG if first it 
controls the local population by focusing on the Papuan people’s needs, as well as 
establishing security for them (Leg-1 on Figure 4). According to McCormick, the 
Indonesian government then should destroy the insurgent infrastructure to reduce the 
OPM’s control and influence over the population (Leg-2 on Figure 4). Afterwards, the 
government can attack the insurgents directly to completely destroy the insurgency (Leg-
3 on Figure 4). In order to secure international support, the Indonesian government 
should undertake diplomatic efforts to build cooperation with foreign countries, including 
efforts taken through the United Nations. In doing so, the government should attempt to 
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punish bad actors diplomatically (Leg-4 on Figure 4). The Indonesian government could 
then, theoretically, destroy the external support and financing of the insurgents in order to 
destroy their hope and motivation to separate from Indonesia (Leg-5 on Figure 4). By 
adhering to these facets of McCormick’s COIN strategy, the Indonesian government 
should be able to eradicate the OPM completely.  
Figure 4.  Gordon McCormick’s “Diamond” Counterinsurgency Model  
 
Wilson, “The Mystic Diamond,” 16. 
The Diamond Model proposes that the Indonesian government directly attack the 
OPM insurgency after first winning the hearts and minds of Papuan people and 
guaranteeing their security. It also recommends that the Indonesian government conduct 
diplomacy with other countries and the United Nations simultaneously to gain 
international support for defeating the OPM. Therefore, in the following pages, this thesis 
examines Indonesia’s COIN strategy during both the New Order Era (1965–1998) and 
the Reformation Era (1999–2014). In doing so, this thesis answers why the Indonesian 
government’s COIN strategy during those times failed.   
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C. FAILING TO FULFILL LOCAL PEOPLE’S NEEDS 
“Our knowledge of circumstances has increased, but our uncertainty, 
instead of having diminished, has only increased. The reason of this is, 
that we do not gain all our experience at once, but by degrees; so our 
determinations continue to be assailed incessantly by fresh experience; 
and the mind, if we may use the expression, must always be under arms.”  
– Carl von Clausewitz69 
In McCormick’s COIN strategy, focusing on the local people’s needs (Leg-1) is 
essential to winning their hearts and minds, thereby enhancing the state’s legitimacy and 
control over them. By doing so, the people’s trust in the state increases while support of 
an insurgency decreases. As a result, military operations directed against the insurgency 
will be more successful. However, the Indonesian government has neglected to give 
sufficient attention to the needs of the local Papuans. As Raweyai says, the essential 
needs of Papua include improvements to infrastructure, education, and health care, in 
order to develop the Papuan province and provide greater opportunities for the people. 
However, there was no significant indication of progress in these areas until 1996.70 In 
short, the Indonesian government had failed to build trust and gain support from the local 
people of the Papuan province, despite having the authority to use all available resources, 
including Papuan natural resources. 
Ironically, in spite of its abundant natural resources, Papua has remained far 
behind other provinces in terms of development. Until 2000, this lag resulted in Papua’s 
possessing the greatest number of poor in Indonesia. According to research on the special 
autonomy performance in Papua, the percentage of poor people in Papua was 51.80%.71 
This level of poverty was similar to the level from 1969 to 1997, which reflected an 
average level of poor at around 50%.72 Whatever the Indonesian government had done 
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during those years, it was not enough to improve Papua and led to claims from most 
Papuans that Papua was being economically exploited. 
Moreover, military approaches conducted by the Indonesian government in order 
to secure the implementation of An Act of Free Choice in 1969 and other New Order 
policies increased negative sentiment among the Papuan people toward Indonesia. As a 
result, although the Indonesian government could physically eliminate the OPM’s 
insurgents, it could not eradicate the insurgency completely.   
1. Completing Short-Term Goals, but Discounting Long-Term Effects 
A new case gets lumped into a category to which it does not belong, and that’s 
when the previously successful theory falls apart. ... According to prototype theory, the 
human mind tends to think in concrete ideal types rather than in rational abstractions. 
This makes it hard to recognize specificity. We see it happening all around us. Even some 
of the most gifted minds and top experts in their fields can fall into this trap. And when 
these convert to cure-allism insist on their theory’s universal applicability, the damage 
can be monumental.73  
Aware of Indonesia’s former successes in defeating rebellions, the president of 
the New Order Era, Soeharto, applied the same military approach in attempting to destroy 
the Papuan separatist movement (Leg-3). The previously successful military operations 
between 1945 and 1965 led the Republic of Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan 
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia [ABRI]74) to capture OPM political insurgents and attack 
OPM’s armed insurgents directly. Clashes began on April 16, 1965, when insurgents 
raised the flag of West Papua and sang their separatist movement song “Hai Tanahku 
Papua” (Hi My Papuan Land) in Manokwari.75 Terianus Arronggear, a kindergarten 
teacher in Manokwari, led this group and organized others such as Kaleb Taran, Manuel 
Horota, and Manuel Watofa to fight underground against the government. However, soon 
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they were captured and exiled to Java Island. Three months later, on July 26, 1965, OPM 
insurgents, led by Jihanis Djambuani, attacked Indonesian Army soldiers conducting a 
flag-raising parade along with other local government employees and local farmers in 
Kebar, Monokwari. This attack killed three soldiers and wounded several civilians.76 
Two days later, Permenas Ferry Awom led more than 400 insurgents to attack the base 
camp of the 641 Cendrawasih I Infantry Battalion in Arfai, Manokwari. This attack killed 
three and wounded four soldiers, while approximately 30 OPM insurgents were killed.77  
As a response, the Indonesian government conducted formal military operations 
called “Operasi Sadar” (Operation of Realization) led by Pangdam XVII/Cendrawasih, 
BG. R. Kartidjo on August 10, 1965.78 This military operation aimed to destroy insurgent 
groups in Manokwari and capture Ferry Awom as soon as possible. On August 25, 1965, 
Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih expanded its operation to include the entire Papuan territory 
in order to prevent other violations from occurring. However, due to the limited numbers 
of soldiers, this operation did not achieve its goal. Then in January 1967 the OPM 
received the support of approximately 14,000 Arfak tribesmen led by Lodewijk 
Mandatjan.79 These tribesmen attacked military posts and convoys in the Manokwari 
area, resulting in losses for both Indonesian soldiers and OPM insurgents. This 
occurrence led the government to further expand its military operations (Leg-3).   
The Indonesian government established the “Brathayudha” and “Wibawa” 
military operations in order to secure the execution of An Act of Free Choice in 1969.80 
These operations were reinforced by troops from outside of Papuan territory in response 
to many armed violations committed by OPM insurgents, such as the incidents in 
Sausapor, Makbon, Anggi, Merauke, Jayapura, Enarotali, and Jayawijaya. By applying 
repressive actions directly toward OPM armed insurgents, the Indonesian military 
succeeded in forcing Mandatjan to surrender and reduced the number of armed insurgents 
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before the implementation of the referendum in July 1969. As Raweyai notes, the OPM 
tried to restructure its organization in 1970.81 This response indicated that the fight by 
armed insurgent forces could be eliminated by direct Leg-3 military operations, but there 
would be negative consequences. The Act of Free Choice, as a result of the New York 
Agreement, could be executed on schedule as the Indonesian government’s goal in the 
short term. Nevertheless, as a long-term effect, the repressive approaches applied by the 
Indonesian military fostered and expanded a negative sentiment toward Indonesia among 
Papuans.  
According to McCormick’s Diamond Model, the Indonesian government applied 
Leg-2 and Leg-3 of the Model in which the Indonesian government directly destroyed the 
OPM armed insurgents and its infrastructures by using military operations. However, the 
failure of the Indonesian government occurred when the Indonesian government attacked 
OPM insurgents directly without providing for local Papuan needs and security (Leg-1). 
During the transition period of the integration from 1963 to 1969, the government was 
too focused on destroying OPM’s armed insurgents to secure the execution of a 
referendum as a final process of Papua’s integration into Indonesia. The ABRI used all 
methods, including brutality, to achieve its duty. As a result, more than 6,000 Indonesian 
troops were deployed around the Papuan territory within five years, to seek and destroy 
any opposition to integration.82 This approach seemed inappropriate when the opposition 
was made up of traditional rebel groups, poorly armed and badly organized. The OPM 
used traditional weapons such as arrows and spears and was divided into many groups 
that had their own strategies and sometimes opposed each other.83  
Moreover, based on its successful experience in destroying previous rebellions, 
the Indonesian government applied military operations brutally in order to destroy the 
armed insurgents as soon as possible and to deter them from future fights against 
Indonesia’s legitimacy. On April 27, 1969, two months before the referendum, Pangdam 
XVII/Cendrawasih (MG. Sarwo Edhi Wibowo) ordered B-26 airplane bombers to 
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bombard Enarotali in response to an attack on an ABRI airplane a couple days before; 
airborne assaults followed three days later.84 This brutal military operation succeeded in 
destroying the insurgency in Enarotali; however, it caused more than 14,000 local 
Papuans to escape out of Enarotali.85  
McCormick’s Diamond can be further discussed and applied using the work of 
Ivan Arreguin-Toft, who claims that there are two kinds of strategies for a strong-actor (a 
state) to win in meeting an internal asymmetric conflict: direct and indirect strategy. He 
insists that every strategy has an ideal counterstrategy in the logic of strategic interaction. 
He defines:  
Direct attack and direct defense are direct strategies, and barbarism and 
guerrilla warfare are indirect strategies. In all other things being equal, the 
strategic interaction and conflict outcomes demonstrate some hypotheses. 
First, if both strong and weak actors use a direct strategy, strong actors 
will win quickly and decisively. Second, weak actors will win if they 
apply an indirect strategy against a direct strategy of strong actors. Third, 
strong actors will keep losing if they use an indirect strategy against weak 
actors who use a direct strategy. Fourth, if strong actors employ barbarism 
to attack, and weak actors defend with a guerrilla warfare strategy, the 
result is strong actors will win.86 (See Figure 5.)  
Unlike McCormick’s model, Arreguin-Toft’s model allows the government to use 
military actions brutally in order to destroy the insurgents completely and avoid a 
prolonged war. 
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Figure 5.  Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes 
(Expected Winner in Cells)87 
 
 
However, there is a lesson to be learned from the Japanese colonization in the 
Asia region in the 1940s. The Japanese troops applied brutal tactics to secure their control 
over South Asian territory. They created dread in their opponents to establish deterrence 
for the long-term war that led to the appearance of more resistance groups against them.88 
For example, as Ruth Benedict claims:  
They [the Burma people] are humiliated either as warriors or as a member 
of their family if they surrender. ... The [Japanese] army lived up to the 
code to such an extent that in the North Burma campaign the proportion of 
the captured to the dead was 142 to 17,166. That was a ratio of 1:120.89  
As a result of this brutality, the Japanese troops encountered more difficulties in 
maintaining the stability of its colonies’ territory afterwards.90 
In other words, despite Arreguin-Toft’s assertion, a strong-actor may not win 
simply by using brutality, as seen in the Papuan conflict. This misperception of military 
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operations led the Indonesian government to achieve its short-term goal of securing the 
execution of referendum in 1969. However, the Indonesian government did not calculate 
the long-term disadvantages of such an approach. Since the Indonesian government did 
not pay more attention to the local Papuans’ needs and only focused on the government’s 
legitimacy after taking over control from UNTEA in 1963, the Indonesian government 
failed to establish trust among the Papuan people and guarantee their security (Leg-1). In 
response, local Papuans failed to provide the support needed to direct military operations, 
a situation resulting in the ABRI applying coercive approaches against the people. Thus, 
even though this brutal military operation was successful in eliminating OPM insurgents 
and securing the execution of An Act of Free Choice in 1969, anti-Indonesia sentiment 
increased afterwards.  
2. Deterrence Led to Human Rights Violations  
After the success of the referendum in 1969 that led Papua to integrate formally 
into Indonesia, the Indonesian government continued its military approach to control and 
secure the Papuan province. In early 1970, the government sent large numbers of soldiers 
to the province as one element of its development policies.91 Approximately 3,000 to 
4,000 ABRI soldiers were sent, along with additional troops that were flown in annually 
to reinforce a very important concept in Indonesian politics, Wawasan Nusantara (the 
unity of the Indonesian archipelago). These soldiers acted as authority symbols opposed 
to Papuan claims for autonomy.92 Possessing enough superior power to deter the OPM 
insurgency in any long conflict, the ABRI became unaccountable for its soldiers’ 
attitudes, leading sometimes to human rights violations. This lack of accountability 
precipitated the failure to generate external support (Leg-4). Additionally, it allowed the 
OPM to rebuild its infrastructure and gain external support from the international 
community (Leg-5). 
According to the seven steps of OPM’s strategy for fighting the Indonesian 
government from 1970 to 2005, the OPM tried to gain attention and support from the 
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local populations (Leg-2) and international community (Leg-5).93 OPM conducted mass 
demonstrations, spread pamphlets, raised OPM flags, and attacked military posts (Leg-3) 
in order to provoke reactions from the ABRI. If the ABRI committed human rights 
violations, the OPM would gain attention and sympathy from other Papuans and the 
international community. As a result, the OPM was able to rebuild its infrastructure and 
obtain external support in order to legitimize its existence. Unfortunately, the ABRI was 
trapped in the OPM strategy and violated human rights in overcoming OPM’s 
provocations. For example, when OPM supporters raised the flag Bintang Kejora (the 
Morning star) peacefully on July 6, 1998, in Biak, the ABRI attacked them brutally, 
killing eight Papuans, leaving three missing, wounding 37, arresting 150, and leaving 32 
unknown dead bodies to be found.94 According to the file of Komnas HAM (the Human 
Rights National Commission), there were 1,396 Papuans killed, 23 missing, 111 raped, 
150 under arrest, 40 tortured, and 221 buildings burned during military operations from 
1965 to 1998 (see Table 1).95 
Table 1. List of Human Rights Violations96 
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This data is possibly not exact, but rather is a representation of an overreaction 
from the Indonesian military that led to violations of human rights during military 
operations. One example of such a reaction involves the kidnapping and murder of 
Dortheys Hiyo Eluay, a former chief of the Papuan Presidium Council (Dewan Presidium 
Papua [PDP]) on November 10, 2001. Eluay was kidnapped and murdered in Koya, 
Jayapura, by a number of Indonesian Special Forces soldiers. This violation happened 
when the soldiers tried to deter other OPM insurgents by kidnapping, torturing, and 
murdering them, making them examples of what to expect if they insisted on fighting 
against the Indonesian government. Even though those soldiers were found guilty and 
sent to prison for more than three years by the Military Supreme Court on April 21, 
2002,97 this case attracted international attention and increased sympathy for the OPM 
insurgency while automatically reducing external support for the Indonesian government.  
Moreover, when the Indonesian military accepted brutality as a tactic, it shocked 
the OPM insurgents for a while, but also produced a higher risk to the whole COIN 
strategy. Demoralized OPM insurgents believed they had no choice to overcome the 
brutal coercive actions of the Indonesian military. As a result, they fought fearlessly and 
led the conflict into a long-term fight with no end in sight. Thus, by not accomplishing 
Leg-1 and Leg-2 of the COIN concept, the successful direct attacks conducted by the 
Indonesian military (Leg-3) portrayed Indonesia as a notorious state in the eyes of 
international community, and provided the OPM with an opportunity to gain external 
support. 
3. Unsatisfied State Policy 
According to McCormick, if state policies satisfy the social value or vice versa, 
the system will be stable. Otherwise, if they do not, adaptation from both sides will be 
necessary to stabilize the system. If the adaptation fails, there will be a conflict (see 
                                                 
97 Gatot Prihanto, “Komnas HAM Diminta Membentuk KPP HAM Kasus Theys [Komnas HAM is 
asked to establish KPP HAM for Theys’ Case].” Penculikan dan Pembunuhan Theys Eluay [Kidnaping and 
Killing of Theys Eluay], November 11, 2003, https://papuapress.wordpress.com/tag/theys-eluay/. 
 37 
Figure 6).98 After formal integration, the Indonesian government possessed legitimate 
control over the Papuan territory. The proper policy of development could have created 
better life for the local people and established trust in the Indonesian government. 
However, again, the government made blunders in applying some policies regarding the 
Papuan economy. When the Papuans did not accept the government’s policies and the 
Indonesian central government still insisted they do so, new conflicts emerged. As a 
result, the local Papuan people were separated into two camps: those who supported the 
government and those who fought against it. The hatred of the Papuans who were 
unsatisfied with the results of the referendum and military operations now had something 
to stimulate their motivation to fight once more against the Indonesian government.   
Figure 6.  Chalmers Johnson’s Revolutionary Change Theory 
 
Adapted from Gordon H. McCormick, “Chalmers Johnson’s Theory of Revolutionary 
Change,” in A Guerrilla Warfare Seminar at Naval Postgraduate School, July 23, 2015 
One of the improper policies from the Indonesian central government was the 
ambitious transmigration program from Java Island to Papua, beginning in the late 1960s 
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and continuing until the mid-1980s. In order to reduce the booming population in Java 
Island and solve the low population in Papua, the Indonesian central government sent 
Javanese transmigrants to occupy almost entire districts of the Papuan province. By April 
1984, the government had sent 691,500 Javanese transmigrants to Papua, not including 
spontaneous migrants from other islands.99 The problems emerged when the government-
built public infrastructures such as roads, schools, and hospitals in the transmigration 
locations appeared much better than those in Papuan villages, and when the government 
provided transmigrants with higher agriculture technologies that helped them to be more 
successful in farming than local Papuan farmers. As a result, the local Papuans lost out in 
local economic competition and remained poor.   
Moreover, when the migrant population exceeded the local Papuan population in 
a particular area, the migrants took control of the local economy and sequestered the local 
Papuans on their own land. According to the District Development Program (Program 
Pengembangan Kecamatan [PPK]), migrants controlled approximately 95% of 3,189 
investments of small and middle industries in Papua in 1999.100 This disparity occurred 
because local Papuan officials preferred to believe in migrants, who possessed higher 
educations and greater financial capital, rather than local Papuans. Moreover, from a total 
population in Papua of 2,217,200, roughly 725,171 non-Papuans lived in cities such as 
Jayapura, Merauke, Sorong.101 Migrants received business permission from the local 
Papuan government more easily than Papuan businessmen. As a result, again, the local 
Papuans lost in economic competition within their own land, and segregation became an 
issue among local Papuans. This situation led the OPM to claim that the transmigration 
program was a form of genocide applied by the central government.  
Another flawed policy involved the contract of the PT Freeport Indonesia 
Company as an affiliate of Freeport-McMoran, United States. Since 1972, the PT 
Freeport Company had excavated and produced approximately 510,000 tons of 
overburden and averaged 128,000 tons of ore processed daily, accommodating about 
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5,100 tons of gold and copper concentrated per day in November 1995. It expanded its 
production to 306,000 tons per day by early 1999.102 According to PT Freeport 
Indonesia, its first working contract, originating in 1973, was valid for 30 years, and that 
contract had been expanded in 1991 for 30 more years with the option to extend it twice 
more for 10 years each time.103 This means that although the working contract between 
the Indonesian government and PT Freeport Indonesia will end in 2021, Freeport retains 
the option to extend it until 2041.  
This working contract was different from the Production Sharing Contract 
(Kontrak Kerja Sama) commonly used in the oil and natural gas industries in Indonesia. 
In this case, the Indonesian government had no control over management and operations 
of PT Freeport Indonesia and received few royalties for copper (1.5%–3.5%), and for 
gold (1% from the selling price).104 This working contract conflicted with Indonesian law 
(Indonesian Constitution Number 5, 1960) in that, by law, the Indonesian government 
must maintain control over all ownership and the use of land, soil, air and all natural 
resources for all the Indonesian people’s interest.105 As a result, the government failed to 
improve the welfare of local Papuans due to an absence of control over the operational 
production of the PT Freeport Indonesia Company and a lack of received profits.  
The second problem regarding the PT Freeport Indonesia company involves the 
local Papuan tribes such as the Amungme and the Kamoro, who live in the mountains and 
in the lowlands of Timika respectively. These tribes were forced by the government to 
move to new areas due to the mining expansions. They suffered from hunger once their 
lands and forests were destroyed and polluted by production waste. Moreover, migrant 
profiteers around Timika excluded them. As Yorrys says, there were about 1,000 native 
Papuans in Timika when the PT Freeport Company began to operate in 1973. However, 
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there were approximately 100,000 people in the same area in 2001, most of whom were 
migrants.106 As a result, the Papuans struggled to compete and to live on their own land 
while suffering. This situation led to the claim they were receiving almost no benefit 
from the mine that had been stolen from them. Eventually, OPM insurgents influenced 
other Papuans to support and join their movement in order to regain ownership of Papuan 
land from the government.   
D. FAILING TO SECURE EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
Too often policy makers overlook the critical factors of anger, resentment, 
and hate. Lost in the detached world of strategy and theory, they forget 
that their enemies and allies alike are ruled as much by emotion as by raw 
power calculations. In military parlance, superior force does win battles, 
but it rarely resolves the roots of wars.107  
After the fall of Soeharto’s administration in May 1998, the successor, B.J. 
Habibie, came under international pressure that led him to offer a referendum for the East 
Timorese population.108 As a result, East Timor seceded formally from Indonesia in the 
latter part of 1999; that secession fueled the Papuan independence movement. The OPM 
then began attempting to gain international support by asking the United Nations to 
review the Papuan territory’s status.  
In order to respond to the situation and accommodate the sharp differences in 
development between the Papuan province and other provinces in Indonesia, the 
Indonesian government issued the Constitution Number 21, 2001109 regarding Special 
Autonomy status for the Papuan province. The Indonesian government expected this 
status to muffle the separatist movement by extending much wider authority to Papua 
                                                 
106 Raweyai, Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent], 133. 
107 Shore, Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions, 74. 
108 Berger and Aspinal, “The Break-up of Indonesia?,” 1008–9. 
109 The Constitution Number 22 Year 1999 regarding the Local Government received wide authorities 
in managing their own territories as a basis of the Constitution Number 21 Year 2001 regarding the Special 
Autonomy for Papua Province. This constitution then was fixed by the Constitution Number 35 Year 2008 
regarding the Special Autonomy status for West Papua Province, which was established in 2006. 
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(Papua province and West Papua province)110 and allowing the people to advance their 
development by their own means without separating from Indonesia. In supporting this 
policy since 2002, the Indonesian government has allocated an additional 2% of the 
General Allocation Budget (Dana Alokasi Umum [DAU]) every year for 20 years. The 
funds must be used for the development of education, health, and the economy in Papua. 
Additionally, Papua has received annually US$72,645,700 to develop and improve its 
infrastructures.111 The Indonesian central government also has increased this fund every 
year by splitting 70% and 30% for Papua province and West Papua province, 
respectively. For example, Papua received approximately US$329,085,021 in 2007112 
and US$512,715,695 in 2014.113 These efforts reflect how the government has tried to fix 
its mistakes from the previous mismanagement of the Papuan conflict by pursuing a more 
political approach through special autonomy status.  
However, the OPM insurgency persists and continues its demand that Papua, as 
an independent state, separate from Indonesia. In 2012, OPM insurgents disrupted local 
security by attacking security forces and other civilians, causing a number of deaths. 
According to Sardjito, there were at least 45 attacks by OPM insurgents that year, leaving 
34 people dead and two others suffering trauma.114 Moreover, irregularities regarding the 
special autonomy funds were discovered, and these irregularities disrupted the 
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development of Papuan welfare. In addition, the security of Papua could not be achieved, 
and optimal development could not be accomplished (failed to achieve Leg-1), leading to 
negative opinions of Indonesia among the international community. As a result, many 
foreign countries, including the United States, reduced their support of Indonesia 
regarding the Papuan conflict, indicating that the government had failed to secure 
international support for this issue (Leg-4). 
1. Underestimation of the Capability of the OPM Insurgency   
Based on the concept of “insurgent control” by McCormick, the insurgents have 
two elements for achieving their movement’s goals: structure and strategy. If they have 
disadvantages in their structure, they have to be better in their strategies.115 In its early 
movement, in 1965, the OPM fought against the Indonesian government openly with a 
formal free movement structure. However, the Indonesian government destroyed it easily 
with armed forces, leading the OPM to continue its struggle afterwards through an 
underground movement. Even though the OPM was divided into many movement groups 
and seemed to lack coordination among them, their movements could not be eliminated 
completely, suggesting that the OPM has already planned its strategy well and changed 
the form of its struggle (see Table 2). On the other hand, the Indonesian government had 
been lulled by the victory of referendum in 1969, and had made initiated policies that 
provided strategic advantages to OPM.  
                                                 
115 McCormick, “A ‘System’ Perspective on Insurgency.” in A Guerrilla Warfare Seminar at Naval 
Postgraduate School, July 23, 2015. 
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Table 2. Seven Steps of the OPM Strategy from 1964 to 2005 
 
Raweyai, Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent], 107. 
Since 1970, the OPM has smoothly implemented its strategy to create a greater 
space for its political influence in order to restructure its movement and gain support or 
sympathy from both national and international communities (Leg-2 and Leg-5). By 
establishing a larger sphere of influence, the OPM could reduce the control space of the 
central government. If the OPM’s structure ever reaches the state breaking point, the 
Indonesian central government would have no ability to control the Papuan social values 
at all, and the OPM would then have a great chance to achieve its final goal of separation 
from Indonesia (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7.  Diagram of OPM Insurgency Structure and Strategy 
 
Adapted from Gordon H. McCormick, “Counterinsurgent Process,” in A Guerrilla 
Warfare Seminar at Naval Postgraduate School, July 21, 2015. 
In order to rebuild and strengthen its structure, the OPM engaged in armed 
resistance and incorporated a political movement into its grand strategy. It began by 
establishing Gerakan Nasional Papua (GENAPA; the Papuan National Movement), 
Natural Papua Nasional (NAPAN; National Natural Papua), Piagam Masyarakat Papua 
Merdeka (PMPM; the Charter of Freedom Papuan People), and Santa Perawan Maria 
(SPM; The Virgin Santa Maria) in 1972 in the Merauke district. Petrus Kmur, Isack 
Rumawak, Karel Rumawir, and E.P. Ius led those political resistances, respectively.116 
As with the early political movements following integration, those organizations had a 
duty to spread the OPM’s ideology among the Papuan people. They distributed anti-
Indonesian pamphlets to influence other Papuans to fight with them in the spirit of 
independence. They established sporadic resistance throughout the Papuan territory, such 
                                                 
116 Raweyai, Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent], 119. 
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as the Hans Bomay and Wenda groups in the border of Kerom and Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), the Willem Onde group in Merauke, the Tadeus Yogi group in Paniai, the Kelly 
Kwalik group in the Central Mountains, and the Kaladana and Uropkulin groups in 
Bintang Mountains (see Figure 8).   
Figure 8.  OPM Armed Insurgent Groups in the 1970s to the 2000s 
 
Source: Raweyai, Mengapa Papua Ingin Merdeka [Why Papuans want to be independent], 125–28. 
According to Thomas Perry Thornton, “acts of terror are instituted as parts of 
planned campaigns to achieve political objectives, thereby also excluding nonpolitical 
terror.”117 OPM insurgents sabotaged, attacked, took hostages, and killed soldiers, police, 
journalists, researchers and other Papuans who had any relation to the Indonesian 
interests in Papua. The OPM needed terror in order both to display its existence to the 
international environment and to provoke the ABRI to violate human rights, thereby 
providing the OPM with propaganda. OPM insurgents initiated armed conflicts with 
                                                 
117 Thomas P. Thornton, “Terror as A Weapon of Political Agitation” in Internal War: Problems and 
Approaches, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), 71. 
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ABRI soldiers, and these conflicts drove other Papuans to leave their houses and villages 
in order to save their lives. The resulting migration occurred in early 1984, when more 
than 10,000 refugees flooded into PNG. However, the OPM claimed this situation was in 
response to the persecution and brutality of ABRI soldiers, who often illegally crossed 
the PNG border in order to pursue armed OPM insurgents hiding there.118 The refugee 
crisis became an international issue when the PNG foreign minister, Rabbie Namaliu, 
asked the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) for financial support for those 
refugees, and complained formally to the UN regarding Indonesia’s repeated incursions 
on October 1, 1984.119  
OPM insurgents also tried to gain additional attention from the international 
community by taking foreign hostages. In late 1995, Kelly Kwalik and his groups took as 
hostages the Lorensz Expedition team, a group of biologists conducting research in 
Mapenduma village, Jayawijaya. The team consisted of 15 researchers; seven were 
German and Dutch from the World Wide Life organization, and eight from Indonesia.120 
Kelly Kwalik demanded that the international community pay more attention to Papua by 
calling upon the Indonesian central government to withdraw its troops from Papua; stop 
the transmigration programs; and discontinue the environmental destruction committed 
by PT Freeport. He also submitted a petition to three countries (England, the Netherlands, 
and Germany) to support OPM struggles.121 Despite this drama ending with an ABRI 
special operations hostage rescue on May 15, 1995, the OPM succeeded in gaining 
attention from the world and opening the door for its political movement.  
From mid-1994 to mid-1995, OPM insurgents began sending reports to some 
foreign countries regarding ABRI troops’ human rights violations committed while 
protecting PT Freeport operations. Those reports were badly written and had to be 
transcribed and edited carefully by journalists and environmental activists Mathew 
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Jamieson and Mathew Karney, and the OPM spokesman John Otto Ondawame,122 before 
being forwarded to the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), an Australian 
NGO.123 Afterwards, ACFOA released its report entitled Trouble at Freeport, alleging 
ABRI and the PT Freeport involvement in various murders and disappearances. This 
report led the Australian ambassador to Indonesia, Alan Taylor, to fly to Papua and talk 
with the people involved. He concluded that the ACFOA report was justified but 
discounted the involvement of PT Freeport.124 Even though both ABRI and PT Freeport 
denied the issue, international pressure increased as the article spread overseas.  
2. Losing International Supports 
After East Timor’s secession in 1998, OPM insurgents convinced other Papuans 
that the government had extracted their natural resources for the benefit of some political 
leaders in Jakarta.125 They also advocated secession from Indonesia as the best solution. 
Therefore, they established the Presidium of Papuan Council (Presidium Dewan Papua 
[PDP]) led by Theys H. Eluay on June 4, 2000 in order to unite and manage their 
struggle.126 They engaged in international activities, such as attending the United Nations 
Millennium Summit in New York, establishing the representative office of the PDP for 
Europe in Ireland, and lobbying the U.S. Congress, as well as establishing the 
representative of Papua in New York.127 These international approaches had two goals: 
to convince the UN that Indonesia had mismanaged Papua and to demand that the UN 
review its decision regarding the integration status of Papua. 
                                                 
122 John Otto Ondawame was an Amungme villager who lived around the PT Freeport copper mine. 
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By receiving support from the international community, OPM insurgents 
succeeded in forcing the central government to withdraw its troops from Papua in 2004. 
This withdrawal allowed them more freedom in coordinating and managing their 
movement afterwards. Nonetheless, the Indonesian central government extended a 
special autonomy status to Papua in 2004 and divided Papua into two provinces (Papua 
and West Papua). OPM insurgents, now more united, disrupted the stability of Papuan 
security. Faced with a lack of soldiers and the difficulties of terrain, the TNI and police 
could not counter these OPM insurgents’ efforts.128  
OPM violations flourished, convincing the U.S. Embassy of Indonesia to release 
publicly the human rights violations committed by Indonesia within 2012 regarding the 
killing and disappearing of some OPM activists.129 The OPM insurgency next sent 
Benny Wenda, one of the OPM leaders, and his Australian legal adviser Jennifer 
Robinson to appear at TEDx Sidney 2013 Forum at the University of Sidney, and this 
conversation was uploaded to YouTube five days later.130 They also convinced the world 
of various violations committed by Indonesia against Papua and its people. Although the 
Australian embassy restated that its government believed the best future of the Papuans 
was as part of Indonesia and highly supported the application of wide-ranging autonomy 
for Papua in the future, the insurgency continued to gain support and sympathy from the 
international community. Approximately 65 organizations from 17 foreign countries have 
supported the OPM’s struggle (table 3). To this point, the insurgency has succeeded in 
enhancing its external support (Leg-5) and made the government’s efforts to stabilize the 
conflict more difficult and complex. In short, the Indonesian government has failed to 
secure its international support and provided an improved opportunity for the OPM to 
strengthen its structure. 
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Table 3. List of Organizations/Institutions Supporting The Free Papua 
Movement Overseas131 
I  In Britain 
1 1 West Papua Association 
2 2 Tapol the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign 
3 3 Forest People Programme 
4 4 National Union of Students 
5 5 The Foundation for Endangered Languages 
6 6 Down to Earth 
7 7 World Development Movement 
8 8 Colombia Solidarity Campaign 
9 9 Oxford Papua Right for Campaign 
10 10 Cambridge Campaign for Peace 
   
II  In Australia 
11 1 Australia West Papua Association 
12 2 International Volunteers for Peace 
13 3 Medical Association for Prevention of War 
14 4 Pax Christi 
15 5 Religious Society for Friends (Quakers) 
      
III  In New Zealand 
16 1 Indonesia Human Rights Committee  
17 2 Peace Movement Aoteorea 
18 3 Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
19 4 Section, Aoteorea 
20 5 Christian World Service 
21 6 Peace Foundation, Aoteorea 
22 7 Disarmament & Security Centre 
23 8 Global Peace and Justice Auckland 
24 9 Pax Christi Aoteorea 
25 10 The New Zealand Council of Economic and Culture Rights 
26 11 Women for Peace 
27 12 The Alliance Party 
    
IV  In Netherlands 
28 1 West Papuan Women Association in the Netherlands 
29 2 Children of Papua 
                                                 
131 Ricard Radja, “Supporting Organization of the Free Papua Movement (OPM) Overseas,” in 
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(Jakarta: Perum LKBN Antara, 2014), 91–94. 
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30 3 Foundation Pro Papua, established by veterans of former Dutch 
New Guinea 
31 4 West Papua Courier 
32 5 Movement Peace, human Rights, Communication and 
Development 
33 6 Pa Vo-Papuan People’s Foundation 
34 7 The Netherlands Centre for Indigenous People 
V In Ireland 
35 1 West Papua Action-Ireland 
36 2 Just Forrest-Ireland 
37 3 Tibet Support Group-Ireland 
38 4 Afri-Ireland 
39 5 Committee of 100-Finlandia 
40 6 East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign-Ireland 
41 7 Cuba Support Group-Ireland 
42 8 Latin America Solidarity Centre-Ireland 
43 9 Trocaire, the Catholic Agency for World Development-Ireland 
44 10 Forest Friend Ireland/Cairdena Coille-Dublin 
45 11 Alternative to Violence-Belfast 
VI In Belgium, Nepal and Sweden 
1 KWIA-Flanders (Belgium) 
2 Coalition of the Flemish North South Movement, Brussels 
Belgium 
3 Nepal Indigenous Peoples Development and Information Service 
Centre (NIPDISC)–Nepal 
4 Anti-Racism Information Service–Switzerland 
5 Swedish Association for Free Papua–Sweden 
VII In the United States and Canada 
1 East Timor Action Network (ET AN) 
2 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
3 Indonesia Human Rights Network–USA 
4 Papuan American Student Association–Washington, DC, New 
York, California, Texas, and Hawaii  
5 West Papua Action Network (WESPAN)–Canada 
6 Canadian Ecumenical Justice Initiatives–Canada 
7 Canadian Action for Indonesia & East Timor–Canada 
8 Canadians Concerned About Ethnic Violence in Indonesia–Canada 
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VIII  In France, Germany, Norway, and Denmark 
 1 Survival International–France 
 2 German Pacific Network–Germany  
 3 Regnskogsfondet–Oslo, Norway 
 4 International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs–Denmark 
   
IX  In Fiji, Uganda, and Timor Leste 
 1 Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC)–Fiji Islands 
 2 Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives (FHRI)–Uganda 
 3 International Platform of Jurists for East Timor–Timor Leste 
 
Table 3 (continued from previous page) 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The OPM has organized its insurgency to reduce Indonesia’s legitimacy and 
control over the ruling structures in Papua through a combination of armed forces and 
both domestic and international political appeals. In response, the Indonesian government 
has applied a COIN strategy to overcome those efforts. As a strategy, Indonesian COIN 
pursues military and political approaches to eliminate the OPM armed and political 
separatists completely. However, the Indonesian central government has failed to 
implement the COIN strategy successfully in Papua, allowing the insurgency to continue. 
McCormick’s Diamond Model of COIN strategy indicates that the Indonesian 
government has been careless in its failure to focus on needs of the local people and their 
security as an essential key to winning their hearts and minds. The government has 
attacked OPM insurgents directly without providing for local Papuan needs and security 
first. Moreover, the Indonesian military committed brutal acts in attempting to destroy the 
OPM’s armed insurgents quickly and deter them from fighting against the government in 
the future. This situation led the ABRI to become trapped in the OPM’s provocation 
strategy of violating human rights. Thus, negative sentiment toward Indonesia has 
increased among the Papuan people and foreign countries, although the government 
retains the means to eliminate the insurgents physically. 
This situation worsened when, despite Papua’s plentiful natural resources, it 
remained the poorest province in Indonesia until 2000 because of blundered 
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governmental policies regarding the development of the Papuan economy. One of its 
failures was the transmigration program that moved people from Java Island to Papua 
during the late 1960s until the mid-1980s without more concern for the native Papuans. 
The Indonesian central government provided better public infrastructures and higher 
agriculture technologies to transmigrants, enabling them to be more successful than the 
local Papuan farmers, and allowing them to control the local economy.  
Another poor policy involved the contract with PT Freeport Indonesia as an 
affiliate of Freeport-McMoran, United States. In agreeing to a contract that excluded 
government control over operational productions of PT Freeport Indonesia and offered 
little profit from those same operations, the Indonesian central government failed to 
improve the welfare of local Papuans. This failure contributed to Papuans being 
segregated on their own land and led to claims that the transmigration program and the 
PT Freeport Company were parts of an Indonesian strategy to neglect and exclude local 
Papuans and extract Papuan natural resources. As a result, the Papuan people separated 
into two segments: those who supported the Indonesian central government and those 
who fought against it. The hatred of the local people with the result of An Act of Free 
Choice in 1969 and resulting military operations, as well as the failed economic 
development afterwards, motivated many to return to fighting the government.   
In addition, the Indonesian government began losing its international support after 
the collapse of the New Order’s administration in 1998. Although Indonesia withdrew its 
reinforcement troops from Papua five years later and in 2004 had extended special 
autonomy status to Papua and divided it into two provinces (Papua and West Papua), 
OPM insurgents continued struggling with greater unity of purpose. The Indonesian 
government underestimated the OPM insurgency capabilities in which they succeeded to 
influence many foreign countries including the United States to reduce their support for 
Indonesia regarding the Papuan conflict. The OPM had already changed the form of their 
struggle to create a larger space for political influence in order to restructure their 
movement and gain support or sympathy from national and international communities 
since 1970. They provoked the ABRI to violate human rights and tried to gain more 
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attention from the international community. After they received that attention, they began 
sending reports regarding ABRI troops’ human rights violations in Papua.  
Shortly after, the OPM succeeded in convincing other Papuans to be on their side 
and in asking the United Nations to review the Papuan territory’s status. As a result, the 
OPM violations could not be controlled, indicating a decline in the Indonesian 
government’s legitimacy and control over Papuan territory. Moreover, the Indonesian 
government failed to secure international support over this issue, leading the Indonesian 
government to avoid directly destroying the OPM infrastructures, OPM armed insurgents, 
and OPM external supports as effectively as it had previously.  
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IV. IMPROVING THE INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY
STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The insurgency in Papua is uniquely founded on historical, cultural, economic, 
and political factors. Therefore, the solution to OPM’s insurgency lies not only with the 
Indonesian military forces, but also requires the use of other approaches to counter the 
insurgency strategy. As Mackinlay indicates, “with so many variables influencing their 
(government’s responses) success and failure, each government’s approach is different, 
and consequently dictates different manifestations of insurgency organization.”132 For 
this reason, the Indonesian government should examine and measure all possible 
solutions in its strategy and then prioritize the best approach(es) to apply. If they do this, 
it is possible for Indonesia to control and diminish the insurgency in Papua. 
In countering the OPM insurgency, it is not a matter of simply winning the hearts 
and minds of the local populations and developing the local economy, but also having the 
right organizational concepts and using certain national resources to match effectively the 
insurgency’s strategy. As Richard Betts says, “An effective strategy is not impossible, but 
it is usually difficult and risky, and what works in one case may not in another that seems 
similar.”133 Thus, in guarding Indonesian sovereignty and protecting its interests, 
Indonesia must use all of the components of its national power: information, diplomacy, 
military force, and economic influence. These elements support each other in a COIN 
strategy.  
B. ANALYSIS 
1. The Indonesian Government COIN Strategy
The OPM insurgency will most likely fight against the Indonesian government by 
means of both armed force and political influence until it achieves its main goal: 
132 Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, 33. 
133 Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” Journal of International Security 25, no. 2 (2000): 5–
50.
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separation as an independent country from Indonesia. It continues struggling because it 
has a system that supports its movement and accepts anything that affects Indonesian 
legitimacy and external support. With supports from local Papuans and the international 
community, the OPM insurgency will develop a stronger structure that can control the 
Papuan territory and exercise more authority over the Papuan people, as well as enjoy a 
better position in the international diplomacy.  
Therefore, the Indonesian government must be careful in overcoming the OPM 
strategy, which is the same as the East Timor insurgency’s strategy. The Indonesian 
government must create various approaches in its COIN strategy to avoid being trapped 
in the insurgents’ strategy of provoking human rights violations, leading to the secession 
of Papua territory in the future.  
2. Using the Diamond Model Effectively  
In the face of widespread humanitarian disasters, on the heels of civil war, 
and in the wake of failed states, the overwhelming temptation to “just do 
something” is understandable but misguided; the case for doing something 
is not necessarily a case for doing something military. … Coercive 
military strategy, like all strategy, must adapt to the existing and 
anticipated future in international environment.134  
The international community is currently paying greater attention to the human 
rights violations in Papua. A small failure in conducting military actions may cause a 
huge effect for the entire Indonesian COIN strategy in Papua. OPM insurgents will easily 
turn such a failure into propaganda to garner political supports domestically and 
internationally. In addition, the situation in Papua cannot be viewed as an internal armed 
conflict because the OPM’s armed insurgents consist of small groups engaging in 
sporadic actions. As Soleman Pontoh claims, military operations can be applied to the 
separatist groups that have an organized armed group with clear hierarchy, control a part 
of the territory, and engage in highly intensive attacks.135 Thus, for Indonesia as a 
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democratic state, military force is the option of last resort in overcoming the OPM 
insurgency. As Gil Merom indicates, “what prevents modern democracies from winning 
small wars is disagreement between state and society over expedient and moral issues 
that concern human life and dignity.”136 This explanation is an essential key for the 
Indonesian government to consider and incorporate into its COIN strategy, especially in 
regards to human rights violations and other negative effects resulting from military 
force. 
The Indonesian government must effectively adopt the McCormick Diamond 
Model to determine applicable the approaches of its COIN strategy in overcoming the 
OPM insurgency. According to Abraham H. Maslow, safety constitutes the second stage 
of a human being’s basic needs.137 Therefore, the safety needs of the local Papuans, such 
as security, protection, stability, law, and freedom for fear must be addressed. If OPM 
insurgents threaten the locals, then the locals likely will support the OPM insurgency out 
of fear for their lives. Thus, although the Indonesian government should not use military 
operations in resolving the Papua conflict, it should continue using coercive diplomacy to 
secure the safety of the local people (Leg-1).  
As Alexander L. George explains, “coercive diplomacy is a strictly defensive 
strategy.”138 This approach proposes to persuade, convince, and force the opponents to 
stop, undo, or retract their plans in order to support the state’s political achievements.139 
The coercive action is not only conducted by means of military operations, but also 
through other ways such as establishing the equipped local KODAM soldiers and 
deploying them effectively, law enforcement, building the proper information network 
regarding the Papuan conflict, and gathering better intelligence on OPM insurgents’ 
abilities, locations, and main leaders. Thus, these actions can be used as security 
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measures within the Indonesian COIN strategy to accomplish Leg-1, Leg-2, and Leg-3 of 
Diamond Model.  
Meanwhile, the government also must secure political support from international 
communities regarding the Papuan conflict (Leg-4) in order to reduce and eliminate the 
external support for OPM (Leg-5). As Virginia Gamba mentions, problems associated 
with the establishment of a security environment early on, and a lack of coordination 
regionally and internationally, are two principal problems that compromise the 
peacemaking initiatives to gain the sustainability of lasting peace.140 Therefore, the 
government should continue applying its political approaches, along with its efforts to 
maintain the stability of the Papuan security. The Indonesian government’s policies 
should support efforts to meet the Papuan people’s needs (Leg-1) and disrupt the OPM’s 
abilities (Leg-2), as well as convince the international community of Indonesia’s 
intentions regarding the conflict (Leg-4 and Leg 5).  
C. ENHANCING GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY AND CONTROL OVER 
PAPUAN PEOPLE AND TERRITORY  
1. Continuing the Implementation of the Special Autonomy Policy 
The special autonomy status extended to Papua by the Indonesian central 
government is the best policy undertaken to resolve the Papuan conflict. By providing a 
handful of authority to the local government, Papua can develop its territory according to 
its own culture and abilities. Correspondingly, the Indonesian central government can 
fully support the local Papuan government programs in developing the quality of the 
economy, education, and health of the Papuan people. By doing so, the Indonesian 
government can meet the essential needs of the Papuan people, leading to a winning of 
their hearts and minds (Leg-1). 
Moreover, in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental 
public service, the Indonesian central government has divided Papua into two provinces, 
Papua and West Papua provinces. This policy significantly influences the Papuan’s 
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development progress. The size of the Papuan territory is 416,060.32 square kilometers 
(Papua: 319,036.05 square kilometers and West Papua: 97,024.27 square kilometers), 
more than three times the size of Java Island (127,499 square kilometers), which consists 
of six provinces.141 Thus, it is difficult for the Papua and West Papua provincial 
governments to manage their territories and provide sufficient services for their people. 
With the total population at approximately 3,593,803 people in 2010,142 the Papuan 
territory ideally should have at least four provinces that can escalate the opening of more 
remote areas in Papua. Nevertheless, by dividing Papua into two provinces, Papua has 
provided better services to its people compared to the conditions 10 years ago. According 
to the report of the Unit for Acceleration of Papua and West Papua Development (Unit 
Percepatan Pembangunan Papua dan Papua Barat [UP4B]) that was published in April 
2013, “Papua has progressed and changed because the country has done a lot to make 
changes happen since the implementation of special autonomy status in 2004.”143 
In addition, according to Paskalis Kossay, the implementation of special 
autonomy and territory expansion in Papua has opened more opportunities for jobs and 
invited more investments, increasing the Papuan economy.144 Papuan wealth has 
increased, and social-economic segregation has declined. As a result, these policies can 
counter the common negative view that Papua is still lagging behind and not changing, a 
view that does not match with the facts. If the Indonesian central government through the 
Papuan local governments continues applying these policies, it will increase the Papuans’ 
trust in the government’s control (Leg-1).  
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Furthermore, the Indonesian government should establish its economic strategy in 
a limited capacity, depending on the situation, and perhaps only in areas where the 
government can guarantee security. This approach must align with the security 
approaches because economic development needs the stability of security, especially in 
remote areas. According to Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, “the often long 
periods of instability brought about by conquering nomadic tribes have had immediate 
effects on welfare through reduction in production and trade.”145 This means that security 
instability affects the economic environment, and eventually the populace’s welfare. 
Thus, the Indonesian government should apply a strategy to maintain and if possible, 
improve the economies of isolated areas, in order to gain the trust of the Papuans in those 
areas. In return, the remote Papuan people will enjoy better lives (Leg-1) and likely 
abandon the OPM insurgency (Leg-2).  
Another reason why the Indonesian government should develop the economies of 
remote areas is to deny the OPM control of the economic process in those areas (Leg-2). 
According to Karen Ballentine, “The opportunity [the economy in conflict time] for 
rebellion is not just shaped by rebel access to mountainous terrain, but also by the limited 
reach of state authority and capacity in other peripheral areas.”146 If the Indonesian 
government does nothing to increase the economy of Papua’s remote areas, the 
insurgency will take control of those areas’ economies. It will erode the trust of the 
remote people in their government and make the government’s efforts to destroy the 
OPM insurgents much harder in that the remote people will have learned to rely on the 
OPM’s economic support. Therefore, the Indonesian government should take advantage 
of economic development, gain the trust of the populace, and also eliminate the 
insurgency’s opportunity to explore and to control the natural resources in those areas. 
This policy could accomplish Leg-1 and Leg-2 of the COIN Diamond Model and 
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enhance the trust of the international community in Indonesia’s ability to resolve the 
Papuan conflict (Leg-4). 
2. Papuan People as a Priority in a Policy Regarding the PT Freeport 
 Company 
According to the 2006 Indonesian vice president, Jusuf Kalla, the working 
contract between the Indonesian government and PT Freeport Company should be 
respected and may not be canceled suddenly, but the Indonesian government must 
evaluate it every five years.147 The PT Freeport Company is one of the biggest copper 
and gold companies in the world and can significantly affect issues domestically and 
internationally. The operational production of the PT Freeport Company in Papua 
involves many national and international companies, including employees and their 
families, as well as the people living in the surrounding the area. The sudden cessation of 
the company’s operational production would negatively affect many countries’ interests 
and many people both directly and indirectly, as well as lead to new problems and 
conflicts. Therefore, the government should be careful in trying to resolve this issue in 
order to gain the trust of Papuan people (Leg-1) and secure international support (Leg-4).  
On the other hand, Indonesia, as one of the world’s democratic countries, is 
involved in the global governance system. Failures to properly resolve the problems 
regarding the PT Freeport Company will become a focus of international attention. The 
investors, human rights organizations, and others will insist on protecting or demanding 
their interests in Papua. If this situation continues without resolution, the problems 
regarding the PT Freeport Company will become more complex and difficult to resolve. 
Thus, the Indonesian government must continue applying concrete policies that 
encourage the existence of the PT Freeport Company in Papua but that also benefit the 
Papuan people, the Indonesian government, and the international community. 
The Indonesian government should regard the welfare of the Papuan people as a 
priority. The significant issues regarding the existence of the PT Freeport Company in 
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Papua are social segregation between the people who live in Timika city and native 
Papuans who live around it, and the environmental destruction resulting from the PT 
Freeport Company’s operational production. These issues could be exploited by the OPM 
insurgency to provoke other Papuans to disrupt the operational production of the 
company, leading to repressive actions conducted by the KODAM soldiers and POLDA 
policemen such as the violent clash on February 21, 2006, that caused the operational 
production of the PT Freeport Company to be temporarily closed.148 Thus, the 
Indonesian government has to launch a campaign of offensive diplomacy toward other 
actors in order to invite and convince them of the best solution for all, especially for the 
Papuan people.  
One of the solutions that should be discussed is reviewing the second Working 
Contract between the Indonesian central government and the PT Freeport Company 
signed in 1991. The Indonesian royalty for exploitation and production is only 1%–3.5% 
of net revenue, and royalty for mining areas is US$0.025–0.05 for an acre a year.149 It 
does not make sense, with the current US$1 = Rp. 14,000.00, that the Indonesian central 
government only gets Rp. 350.00 to Rp. 700.00 per acre per year. How can the 
Indonesian government provide for the welfare of the Papuan people who live around the 
mining areas with such small amounts of money? The Indonesian central government 
must undertake this contract review and involve the Papuan local government as much as 
possible in reaching a solution. 
Another solution involves convincing the PT Freeport Company to build smelters 
in Papua. This solution could be used as a tool for the Indonesian government to directly 
control the production of mining concentrates, as well as opening the job fields for native 
Papuans. By building smelters in Papua, the native Papuans could be involved as 
laborers, and such an effort would also attract more economic investment in Papua. This 
approach directly and indirectly would increase the welfare quality of native Papuans 
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living around the mining areas. Therefore, if the central government can tightly control 
its official management of royalties and convince the PT Freeport Company to review its 
second Working Contract in sharing proportional royalty, as well as building the smelters 
in Papua, the government can improve the local Papuans’ welfare. 
Regarding the environmental issue, the Indonesian central government should 
invite NGOs that are concerned about current environmental destruction to persuade the 
PT Freeport Company to correct its management of waste production. According to 
Marwan Batubara, the waste production of the PT Freeport Company, consisting of 
200,000 tons a day, is a dangerous contaminant to aquatic organisms.150 It will destroy 
the ecosystem along rivers around the mining areas and contaminate those who rely on 
those rivers for living. If there are no mitigating actions regarding this issue, the result 
will be an indirect mass genocide of the people around the mining areas. This 
environmental destruction also violates the Indonesian Constitution No. 23/1997. Thus, 
the government, the PT Freeport Company, and both domestic and international NGOs 
should conduct coordinated discussions regarding the best solution to avoid the worst 
contamination by the PT Freeport Company’s waste production. By achieving this 
solution, the government will earn the trust of the Papuan people, who will enjoy a better 
quality of health in their own land (Leg-1). 
D. DESTROYING THE OPM’S ABILITIES  
1. Equipped Soldiers and Effective Deployment  
The Indonesian government should effectively use its military forces to support 
its COIN strategy in overcoming the Papuan insurgency. Once the government requires 
military force, the force must completely accomplish its missions to avoid prolonged 
wars and also to reduce collateral damage (Leg-3) in order to guarantee the security of 
Papuan people (Leg-1). Therefore, the Indonesian government must adequately equip and 
properly train its soldiers prior to their deployment. As Merom says, “In particular, once 
democracies decide to intervene in situations that can degenerate into small wars, they try 
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to act decisively and with overwhelming force but without resort to their ground 
troops.”151  
For example, the current deployment of Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih soldiers and 
Papuan Polda policemen in Papua is only 2,650 personnel. They have to guard and be 
responsible for 421,981 square kilometers of land, 228,000 square kilometers of ocean, 
817 kilometers of the Indonesian border with New Guinea, and additionally, the Papuan 
population of more than 2,274,300.152 It is difficult for them to do their job well in 
guaranteeing the security for the Papuan people. Moreover, Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih 
soldiers and Papuan Polda policemen have limited and unsophisticated operational 
equipment that cannot efficiently and rapidly react in the Papuan geography. There are 
many dense and muddy forests in Papua, serving as base camps for the OPM. 
Therefore, in securing the local people, the KODAM XVI/Cendrawasih soldiers 
and POLDA Papuan policemen must be ready with all technical supports possible, 
including sophisticated equipment, high tactical weapons, high mobility helicopters, and 
improved intelligence support. They should also be effectively deployed in particular 
areas that have high intensity OPM armed insurgent violations, and in areas that can be 
used to isolate the armed insurgents from other internal and external supports such as 
land and water borders with neighboring countries (Leg-2). With highly skilled soldiers 
and policemen, proper equipment, fast mobility, and accurate intelligence, KODAM XI/
Cendrawasih soldiers and POLDA Papuan policemen can secure Papuan territory and the 
Papuan people from the violations of OPM insurgents (Leg-1). 
2. The Law Enforcement 
In October 2004 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
unanimously passed Resolution 1566, which defines terrorism and 
declares that in no circumstances can terrorist acts be condoned or excused 
for political or ideological reasons: Criminal acts, including [those] against 
civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, 
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or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a 
population or compel a government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the 
scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols 
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other similar nature. (UNSC Resolution 1566, October 
2004)153 
The separatist movement in Papua engages in many violations against other 
Papuans and the legal Indonesian government. The OPM insurgency, through its armed 
insurgents, conducts mass terror against the Indonesian government and Papuans, who do 
not support them. They kidnap, take hostages, and kill TNI soldiers, Indonesian 
policemen, and civilians, including foreign citizens, in order to force the Indonesian 
government to change its policy regarding the Papuan territory. They are not members of 
a regular army and have no clear front lines, nor do they adhere to the Geneva 
Convention’s rules of war. Therefore, they can become particularly dangerous for 
Indonesia’s sovereignty and security stability in the region.  
Moreover, according to the article 106 and 107 of Kitab Undang Undang Hukum 
Pidana (KUHP; the Indonesian Criminal Law book), all efforts to separate, and those 
who lead to separate the entire or a part of the Indonesian territory from the Indonesian 
sovereignty, can be charged in prison by a life sentence or up to 20 years confinement.154 
It is clear that the OPM insurgency conducts criminal actions in pursuing its goal of 
separation from Indonesia. Therefore, its leaders and members can be legally 
apprehended by the Indonesian policemen and charged by the Indonesian legal justice 
system. There is no excuse for the Indonesian government, through its police, not to 
enforce the Indonesian law towards the OPM insurgents who are criminals and violate 
Indonesian law.  
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Supported by the implementation of special autonomy and a good will political 
approach, law enforcement can reduce the OPM insurgency to an extremist organization 
of criminals who are capable of conducting terrorist attacks and threatening Indonesian 
national security. In response, the OPM insurgents will lose popular support from both 
Papuans and the international community (Leg-2 and Leg-5), leading to the Indonesian 
government finally being able to eliminate them. The Indonesian government should 
proportionally catch and charge the OPM insurgency leaders, such as Dany Kagoya, 
Goliat Tabuni, and Benny Wenda and their men, in order to reduce the effectiveness of 
the OPM insurgency. If the government applies this concept correctly and precisely, the 
result will support the implementation of the Indonesian COIN strategy in overcoming 
the Papua insurgency entirely. 
E. SECURING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT  
1. Winning the War of Opinions 
Indonesia, as one of the largest democratic countries in the world, seeks a 
democratic solution to its problems in wartime as well as in peacetime. Thus, the 
Indonesian government needs an information strategy to unify public opinion nationally 
and internationally (Leg-1 and Leg-4) before undertaking other strategies to defeat the 
Papua insurgency directly (Leg-3). The end of military operations in Papua in 2005 
showed that the Indonesian government did not have enough support domestically and 
internationally. The human rights violations during the military operations forced the 
Indonesian government to withdraw its soldiers from Papua. This situation proved that 
OPM insurgents could establish negative opinion of Indonesian soldiers in order to gain 
sympathy from the world. 
The OPM insurgency has used propaganda to systematically gain public support. 
It succeeded in encouraging domestic and international NGOs and some countries to 
force the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Papua. At the beginning of 2004, the 
Indonesian Armed Forces succeeded significantly in eliminating the number of Papuan 
insurgents. However, the insurgency used social media and its structures in foreign 
countries to spread irresponsible data of the Indonesian military’s human rights violations 
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and gained support from both the Indonesian public and some foreign countries. After 
interventions by the international community, the Indonesian government finally 
withdrew its military from Papua in 2005. A week after the withdrawal of troops 
concluded, the OPM attacked the weapon storage locations of Puncak Jaya Military 
District Command (Kodim Puncak Jaya), resulting in 20 rifles being stolen, and two 
soldiers being killed by insurgents.155 Even though the TNI soldiers sent two combat 
companies to Papua in order to hunt the insurgency, those soldiers could not locate all the 
weapons and attackers before withdrawing them six months later. 
Douglas Borer made the following observation: “What is information today will 
still be information tomorrow, but the effect of a given piece of information may be very 
different from one day to the next, depending on the time, the circumstances, the actors 
involved, and most importantly, who the consumers or recipients of that information 
are.”156 Every single piece of information is critical and affects people’s opinions. 
Therefore, the Indonesian government should pay more attention to the effects of 
negative information on its efforts to reconstruct Papua. The government should release 
the correct information regarding its positive efforts. The government should also publish 
a balance of news, including the negative activities of its soldiers, as part of a 
transparency process solution to human rights violations. In other words, Indonesia needs 
a particular strategy to face the battle for the story,157 in order to win people’s minds and 
gain global support (Leg-1 and Leg-4) for destroying the Papuan insurgency completely.  
As John Arquilla notes, “Information strategy is a still-forming phenomenon that 
has both technological and nontechnological components, and that encompasses both 
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what one intends to do to the enemy and what one intends to do for oneself.”158 In 
destroying the Papuan insurgency, the Indonesian government should develop the 
opinion that the OPM has violated the Indonesian constitution and become a danger to 
Indonesian sovereignty. The Indonesian government should continuously inform the 
global community on OPM’s negative activities and ideologies, including the utilization 
of media, to include social and formal media. All Indonesian people and the international 
community must know how the OPM’s actions harm Papuan society and its economic 
development, including the attacks on Indonesian soldiers in Papua. The Indonesian 
government broadcasts this information continually in order to propagate the negative 
effects of the OPM insurgency. This approach provides a general knowledge of what 
OPM does, how it terrorizes Papuan society, and how it creates hazards to national 
security.  
According to McCormick, one’s preferences are not always driven by rationality, 
but they are absolutely drawn from nurture.159 The Papuan people and international 
community did not create their preferences by themselves, but the OPM insurgents did 
build and provide particular preferences for them. If the Indonesian government could 
change those preferences, the people would have better options than to support the OPM 
(Leg-2). Thus, if the Indonesian government informational approach gains at least 1% of 
the Papuan people and foreign countries as active supports, and 99% of others do nothing 
to support the OPM insurgency, the Indonesian government could destroy the insurgency. 
2. Playing Good Diplomacy in a Dynamic International Political Change 
Indonesia’s failure to challenge interventions from foreign countries regarding the 
withdrawal of Indonesian forces from Papua in 2005 is a lesson for building better 
diplomacy in the future. Indonesia realizes that to overcome an insurgency, they not only 
must use coercive actions, but also must pursue diplomatic strategies. Indeed, 
understanding and solving political problems in Papua is difficult, and Indonesia cannot 
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resolve them in a short period of time. The situation in Papua requires time to construct 
firm relationships based on the shared interests of the Indonesian people, including Papua 
and the international community. As the sixth Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono says, the best way to boost the international influence of Indonesia is not 
using hard power but soft power.160 Thus, Indonesia must focus more on its soft power to 
conduct successful diplomacy towards the international community in order to gain 
support regarding the Papuan conflict (Leg-4).  
In order to gain international support, the OPM insurgency built international 
networks, in England, Belgium, Holland, Papua New Guinea, and Australia. They 
communicate effectively with those countries’ government officials and individual 
politicians. As Thomas P.M. Barnett says, “The global war on terrorism is all about 
connectivity because the terrorists themselves arise in response to such emerging 
networks.”161 The OPM insurgency will always try to build international networks to 
gain support for its struggle. Even though most formal officials of those governments 
deny that their countries support the OPM insurgency,162 the OPM insurgency has 
representative offices in those nations. As a result, there are senators in those countries 
who personally support Papua’s separation from Indonesia.163 By using their authority, it 
is possible that they will influence their governments to change their policies regarding 
Papua.  
To overcome these possibilities, Indonesia should employ two methods of soft 
power. The first is to strengthen the domestic political system in order to build internal 
political stability. As William R. Keylor mentions, “The increasingly contentious 
political situation in Indonesia soon attracted the attention of foreign powers, both within 
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and outside the region, which sought to profit from the simmering conflict between the 
government and its opponents.”164 If the Indonesian government can eliminate the 
arguing or conflicts of interests of its internal opponents, Indonesia will strengthen its 
ability to prevent adverse policies or actions from foreign countries. An example is the 
international intervention in the Indonesian internal political crisis in 1998 that led to the 
rushed decision to promise free elections for East Timor.165  
Thus, the Indonesian government must have support from its people and their 
senators order to maintain the stabilization of Indonesian internal politics, especially with 
regards to the Papuan conflict. As Borer says, “Legitimacy of all governments is 
ultimately rooted in the domestic policy, embedded in the relation nexus between the 
rulers and the ruled.”166 Destroying the OPM insurgency requires political will from all 
Indonesian local political leaders.  
The second method is to increase Indonesian political efforts to build cooperation 
and trust among regional and global powers. According to Louis Kriesberg’s theory of 
conflict resolution, in order to minimize the destruction associated with conflicts and 
obtain mutually beneficial results, the state has to generate sympathy and empathy from 
the internal and external communities.167 By increasing political international 
cooperation, it will be easier for the Indonesian government to gain the support of the 
international community. However, this cooperation must be focused on protecting 
Indonesian national interests as a priority. Therefore, the Indonesian government needs 
qualified diplomats, as well as other factors of political bargaining, such as military and 
economic power.  
Indonesian diplomats should be able to build cooperation with other influential 
countries, such as the United States, China, and Russia, and establish collective regional 
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and global security agreements in order to maintain the stability of Indonesian national 
security and perpetuate Indonesian sovereignty for the long term. As Stephen J. Cimbala 
states, “Collective security should be based on a strict prohibition against resorting to 
forcing the resolution of political disputes and is binding on all states on a regional or 
global basis.”168 In doing so, Indonesian diplomats must understand the dynamic political 
world, in order to protect Indonesian interests from other international actors. As 
Yudhoyono says in his book Selalu Ada Pilihan (There are always choices), the current 
international cooperation’s structures requires [Indonesian leaders] to smartly and 
creatively develop diplomacy and international relations in order to support and 
guarantee the Indonesian interests.169 By actively joining the international community in 
resolving global issues, the international community will feel that Indonesia is a part of 
its community, and of course, it will subsequently improve the Indonesian bargaining 
position.  
Furthermore, the Indonesian government must commit to preventing internal 
human rights violations, not only in Papua, but also in the entire Indonesian archipelago. 
Since such violations are a most controversial issue, highlighted by the international 
community’s reaction to the OPM insurgency, the Indonesian government must 
demonstrate its good will regarding this issue. As the Indonesian president from 2004 to 
2014, Yudhoyono stated: 
I understand there are many international concerns regarding the human 
rights issue in Papua. I guarantee that the TNI soldiers and Indonesian 
policemen in Papua also respect the law and the human rights. If there is a 
violation regarding the human rights there, I will punish whoever is at 
fault. There will be no one immune and the military trial will be held. … 
However, you have to remember that although I have changed my policy 
regarding Papua from more of a security approach to more of a political 
approach, the OPM insurgents keep attacking and killing our soldiers, 
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policemen, and civilians. … Thus, I hope the world will be fair as well, 
and objectively see the reality in receiving the information.170 
By pursuing these political approaches, the Indonesian government can convince 
the international community of its commitment and consistency in properly solving the 
Papuan conflict without violating the human rights (Leg-4). This commitment and 
consistency will be key factors in the success of the Indonesian government to reduce the 
international support for the OPM insurgency (Leg-5). The commitment and consistency 
of the Indonesian government is one of the common weapons of social influence, and it is 
also highly valued in the world culture.171 
F. SUMMARY 
The solution regarding the OPM’s insurgency requires other approaches due to its 
historical, cultural, economic, and political background. As one of the democratic 
countries in the world, Indonesia needs the right organizational concepts in its COIN 
strategy to use effectively all of its national resources in a democratic framework. It 
consists of three important keys of the COIN Diamond Model: enhancing the government 
legitimacy and control over Papuan people and territory, destroying the OPM’s abilities, 
and securing domestic and international support.   
In order to enhance its legitimacy and control over Papuan people and territory, 
the Indonesian government should continue the implementation of Papuan special 
autonomy policy and prioritize the welfare of the Papuan people in making a policy 
regarding the PT Freeport Company. These approaches could accomplish Leg-1 and Leg-
2 of the Diamond COIN Model and also enhance the trust of the international community 
in Indonesia’s ability to resolve the Papuan conflict (Leg-4). Furthermore, in destroying 
the OPM’s abilities (Leg-2, Leg-3, and Leg-5), the Indonesian government should equip 
Papuan KODAM’s soldiers and deploy them effectively, as well as enforce the law in 
Papua strictly.  
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Finally, the Indonesian government should secure its domestic and international 
support by winning the war of influence, and playing the good diplomacy in a dynamic 
international political change. These approaches will be key factors in the success of the 
Indonesian government to secure its domestic and international support (Leg-1 and Leg-
4) as well as to reduce the domestic and international support of the OPM insurgency 
(Leg-2 and Leg-5) at the same time. Thus, by applying three important keys of the COIN 
Diamond Model in patching all the weaknesses of the current Indonesian COIN strategy, 
the Indonesian government will be capable of completely destroying the OPM 
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